Osprey - General Military - Knight - The Warrior and ... - Brego-weard

But the knightly charge was not a one-shot weapon. In most cases the squadrons of
knights would be able to fall back and regroup. In tournament hcej or 'lists', barriers
or earthwork enclosures marked out the area of recets, safe areas where tired and
wounded knights might retire, rest and collect fresh weapons and horses. On the
battlefield a good commander ensured that he had reserves, fresh squadrons of knights
or, as in the case of the Order of the Templars, sergeants and squires, who could ride
forward to relieve the first line or launch charges of their own — a series of hammer
blows against the enemy. The composition of the late medieval lance in the Compagniej
d'Ordonnance of France and Burgundy, of which more in the next chapter, had a fully
armoured gendarme or man-at-arms supported by between two and four less well-
equipped cavalry. Footsoldiers were often used in a similar way, particularly during
the crusades where their solid defence and firepower could hold the Saracens at a
distance until the knights were ready to charge and the Saracens had begun to tire, or
whilst the knights prepared themselves to charge again, collecting spare lances, shields
and fresh mounts from their squires. There might even be an opportunity for a knight
to remove his helmet and take some air and refreshment before he rejoined the fray.
Even with the enemy broken the careful knight would be in no hurry to break ranks
in pursuit. Apart from the danger of the enemy's having reserves they might be
conducting a feigned flight. Perhaps the most famous example of this occurred at
Hastings in 1066 where the Norman knights turned pretending to flee in order to draw
out the English infantry from their shieldwall, which had proven almost invulnerable
to the Norman charges. Much ink has been spilt over whether this was a tactic of which
the knight was capable. Many believe that such a manoeuvre required a level of
discipline, morale and cohesion that could only be produced in a professional, standing
force of cavalry that drilled on a regular basis. It was indeed a dangerous manoeuvre,
tricky to perform and always with the risk that a vigorous pursuit might see the ruse
turning into a real rout. The feigned flight also broke up that all important cohesion and
the turn and counter-attack would certainly require careful timing, and was not
guaranteed to be successful. The poem the Carmen de Haejtingae Proelio, perhaps the
earliest account of the battle of Hastings, written within a few years of the battle, makes
this clear. As the Norman horse turned and began to cut down the pursuing English the
latter 'prevailing by their number, repulsed the enemy and by their might compelled him
to run - and then the flight which had first been a ruse became enforced by valour.
The Normans fled, their shields covered their backs!' But (list because a tactic is
difficult to get right and risky to perform does not mean it was beyond the capabilities
of the knight to perform. The question is one of training. It is clear that the tactic was
practised and performed by Carolingian horsemen. At a muster of the Carolingian army
at Worms in 842, the horsemen performed a sort of training exercise:
TACTICS AND TRAINING -}=>•
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