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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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Purvis v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, No. 1 CA-CV 10-0311, 2011 WL 662842 (Ariz. Ct. App, Div.<br />

1 Feb. 24, 2011).<br />

Appellant argued that promissory notes issued in connection with bridge loan<br />

transactions were not “securities” requiring registration under the 1933 Securities Act. The court<br />

held that a note is a “security” under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1801.26, and the appellant failed to<br />

carry his burden and establish that any statutory exemption applied. Accordingly, it affirmed the<br />

Commission’s decision holding appellant liable for violations of the Arizona Securities Act.<br />

West v. State of Indiana, 942 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).<br />

Defendant was convicted for using fraud in the offer or sale of a security and for selling<br />

unregistered securities. He argued that his conviction should be overturned because the term<br />

“investment contract” is undefined and, thus, the definition of a security under Indiana Code §<br />

23-2-1-1(k) is unconstitutionally vague. At trial, the State applied the test from American<br />

Fletcher Mort. Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247 (7 th Cir. 1980), as adopted by<br />

Indiana courts in Manns v. Skolnik, 666 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), to determine whether<br />

the transaction was an investment contract. According to the test, an investment contract arises<br />

whenever a person (1) invests money (2) in a common enterprise (3) premised upon a reasonable<br />

expectation of profits (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.<br />

The court affirmed the conviction and held that, although a person of ordinary intelligence may<br />

not generally understand whether a particular document falls under the definition of a security,<br />

that lack of comprehension does not render the statute void when the jury was given sufficient<br />

information to determine under the American Fletcher test whether the investment contract was a<br />

security.<br />

A.<br />

A.<br />

B. Liabilities under the Securities Act of 1933<br />

1. Section 11<br />

B.1<br />

Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762<br />

(1st Cir. Mass. 2011).<br />

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in<br />

part the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs-appellants’ putative class action complaint alleging<br />

violation of, inter alia, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 from plaintiffs-appellants’<br />

purchase of mortgage-backed securities. The Court affirmed the district court’s holding that<br />

plaintiffs-appellants lacked Article III standing to pursue claims based upon trusts from which<br />

they had not purchased securities. Following a de novo review regarding the sufficiency of<br />

alleged misstatements, the Court sustained alleged misstatements concerning lending guidelines,<br />

for which plaintiffs-appellants alleged a wholesale abandonment of underwriting standards. The<br />

3

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