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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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F.4<br />

Berman v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 1002683 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011).<br />

Using proceeds from the sale of stock, plaintiffs acquired floating rate notes with a<br />

market value of approximately $8.3 million. Under section 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code,<br />

the plaintiffs could defer capital gains tax on the sale of the stock as long as they did not sell the<br />

replacement property, the floating rate notes. The plaintiffs participated in a 90% loan program,<br />

which was run by two affiliated companies (the “Companies”). The Companies claimed that the<br />

90% loan program would allow the plaintiffs to pledge their floating rate notes as loan collateral<br />

and in return receive 90% of the collateral value in cash without selling the replacement property<br />

and triggering the tax consequences. Instead of holding the collateral, the Companies<br />

immediately sold the collateral upon receipt. The Companies had an account with defendant, a<br />

securities broker-dealer. The collateral was deposited into the Companies’ account with<br />

defendant, and the Companies instructed the defendant to direct a trader to sell the pledged<br />

collateral. The defendant then wired the sale proceeds to the Companies’ bank account. The<br />

Internal Revenue Service informed plaintiffs that because the replacement property was sold,<br />

plaintiffs did not qualify for the deferred capital gains tax and were liable for taxes and penalties.<br />

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant aided and abetted the Companies’ breach of fiduciary duty.<br />

Under New York law, a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires: (1) a<br />

breach by a fiduciary of obligation to another, (2) that the defendant knowingly induced or<br />

participated in the breach, and (3) that plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach. The<br />

court found that plaintiffs failed to show that defendant had actual knowledge of the breach.<br />

Fulton Bank v. UBS Securities, 2011 WL 5386376 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2011)<br />

Fulton Bank (“Fulton”) brought a claim against UBS Securities (“UBS”) for breach of<br />

fiduciary duty. Fulton held institutional investment accounts with two broker-dealers, PNC and<br />

NatCity. Using these accounts, Fulton purchased Auction Rate Securities (“ARS”) at an auction<br />

managed by UBS. In its complaint, Fulton stated that UBS was Fulton’s broker-dealer and<br />

improperly misled them by placing support bids that artificially inflated the value of ARS.<br />

Fulton also alleged that had it known about the instability of the ARS market, or been told that<br />

UBS supported the auctions despite insufficient investor demand, it would not have continued<br />

investing in ARS. The court dismissed and found that UBS did not breach any fiduciary duty<br />

because “no such relationship developed between UBS and Fulton.” In order to prove that a<br />

breach of fiduciary duty occurred, a party must show confidence reposed by one side and<br />

domination and influence exercised by another. The court emphasized that it is not enough to<br />

show that plaintiff reposed its trust in defendant. Instead, defendant must have accepted the<br />

fiduciary relationship. Here, the court explained that Fulton’s interaction with UBS was solely<br />

through its retail brokers. This indirect relationship was not enough to create any fiduciary duty.<br />

F.4<br />

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