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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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court’s crucial finding for purposes of its sanctions award was that plaintiffs failed to conduct a<br />

reasonable inquiry before filing suit. The Sixth Circuit determined that this finding went far<br />

beyond the basis for the defendant’s sanctions motion, which was that the plaintiffs’ proposed<br />

third amended complaint completely failed to address the fatal absence of personal jurisdiction.<br />

The Sixth Circuit also held that the district court did not ensure that the plaintiffs had sufficient<br />

notice of the basis for sanctions before making its sanctions finding.<br />

In re United Health Gr. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 631 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2011).<br />

The Eighth Circuit offered the district court’s award of online research costs. The district<br />

court approved the settlement of a derivative action involving the granting of backdated stock<br />

options and awarded $175,000 for online legal research costs. A shareholder appealed the<br />

award, arguing that counsel was not entitled to recover such costs.<br />

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the award, holding that online research costs may be<br />

recovered as part of litigation expenses in a settlement proceeding. The court distinguished prior<br />

cases that had denied recovery of such costs on the grounds that those cases involved fee shifting<br />

statutes, not settlement.<br />

Lynch v. Whitney, 419 F. App’x 826 (10th Cir. 2011).<br />

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s affirmation of a FINRA arbitration panel’s<br />

award of attorneys’ fees. The court noted that the defendant’s submission of an affidavit that<br />

listed its attorneys’ fees, though not preferable to submitting detailed fee records, did not provide<br />

a basis for reversal. The court further concluded that the appellants’ challenge to attorneys’ fees<br />

was meritless and warranted sanctions.<br />

Suess v. FDIC, 770 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2011).<br />

The court granted the FDIC’s summary judgment motion, finding that the plaintiff, a<br />

shareholder of an insolvent thrift, was not entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees and costs that he<br />

incurred unsuccessfully defending an appeal. The court held that absent an express agreement,<br />

the fact that the FDIC reimbursed the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs for his efforts in the<br />

trial court as a part of a settlement agreement did not mean that he had an automatic right to<br />

claim fees and costs for the appeal. The court further found that the FDIC did not breach its<br />

statutory responsibility to the shareholders of the thrift, including the plaintiff, as it did in fact<br />

represent their interests on appeal.<br />

The court held that none of the exceptions to the American Rule was applicable The court<br />

also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the FDIC’s payment of fees and costs pursuant to the<br />

K.4<br />

K.4<br />

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