04.01.2014 Views

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court held that the alleged misstatements at issue<br />

(concerning customer supply agreements, and the failure to file same pursuant to Item 601(b)(1)<br />

of Regulation S-K) were not material misstatements or omissions sufficient to state a claim under<br />

Section 11. To the extent statements concerning STEC’s customers did constitute a material<br />

misstatement, the court nonetheless dismissed the Section 11 claim on the ground that plaintiffs<br />

“ha[d] not alleged” loss causation.<br />

Maine State Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2011 WL 4389689 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2011).<br />

The district court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss a second amended<br />

class action complaint alleging violation of, inter alia, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,<br />

arising from 427 separate offerings in which disclosures regarding Countrywide’s loan<br />

origination practices were alleged to be materially untrue or misleading. For tranches of<br />

mortgage-backed securities where none of the named plaintiffs had made a purchase, the Section<br />

11 claim was dismissed for lack of standing. Because “each tranche is indisputably a separate<br />

security,” the court held it was not enough to have purchased from a tranche issued pursuant to<br />

the same prospectus supplements; plaintiffs were required to have purchased from each tranche<br />

at issue. Failure to purchase from each tranche also deprived plaintiffs of constitutional standing<br />

under Article III (because they suffered no personal injury, and therefore had no standing to sue<br />

upon, tranche investments that they did not make); the interconnectedness of the tranches was<br />

deemed “largely irrelevant.” The Section 11 claim was otherwise sustained on the grounds that<br />

allegations concerning systematic deviations from and disregard for underwriting guidelines<br />

were sufficient to state a claim, and plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded materiality and injury in<br />

that the allegations in the complaint did not conclusively demonstrate the absence of loss<br />

causation. The court reserved judgment on whether aftermarket purchasers had sufficiently<br />

pleaded reliance on the registration statement given its decision on standing, which may have<br />

mooted the reliance issue.<br />

In re STEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 2669217 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2011).<br />

The district court denied the STEC defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the motion<br />

to dismiss by the underwriter defendants, without prejudice to replead, in connection with a<br />

second consolidated amended complaint alleging violation of, inter alia, Section 11 of the<br />

Securities Act of 1933, arising from alleged misstatements and omissions that inflated the<br />

company’s stock price (which allegedly collapsed upon corrective disclosure of same). The<br />

court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged material misrepresentations in support of their<br />

Section 11 claim on the grounds that disclosures in the prospectus regarding a large customer<br />

sales order constituted misleading “half-truths” because they failed to disclose that the order was<br />

not truly reflective of product demand, was not an ordinary course contract, and could not be<br />

expected to drive ongoing sales at similar levels, all of which was revealed when the company<br />

later described the agreement as a “one-off”. Plaintiffs’ Section 11 claim against the underwriter<br />

B.1<br />

B.1<br />

19

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!