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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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noted that the SEC had “merely rephrase[ed] one of its arguments for why [defendant] provided<br />

the requisite ‘substantial assistance’ to establish aiding and abetting liability” without offering<br />

additional evidence.<br />

6. Section 18<br />

C.6<br />

SRM Global Fund Ltd P’ship v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23526 (2d Cir.<br />

Nov. 23, 2011).<br />

Plaintiff asserted violations of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,<br />

claiming that defendants’ statements of adequate liquidity in 2007 SEC filings were false and<br />

misleading in light of the fact that defendants later acknowledged that the company had lost<br />

liquidity and viability during 2007. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of<br />

the claims, reasoning that (1) because fraud cannot be pled by hindsight, a claim must be<br />

dismissed where plaintiff fails to allege that defendants knew the allegedly fraudulent statements<br />

were false at the time the statements were made; (2) defendants’ optimistic statements were<br />

forward-looking and non-actionable; and (3) plaintiff improperly failed to allege that the<br />

liquidity position in the SEC filings was, in fact, misstated.<br />

Special Situations Fund III, L.P. v. Am. Dental Partners, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D. Mass.<br />

2011).<br />

Defendants moved to dismiss claims under Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of<br />

1934 where claims were asserted more than one year after plaintiffs discovered facts giving rise<br />

to their claims. Plaintiffs argued that the Section 18 statute of limitations had been tolled by a<br />

class action pending against the defendants under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The court<br />

dismissed the Section 18 claim as time-barred, rejecting the proposed application of the class<br />

action tolling doctrine on the ground that, because of the Section 10(b) scienter requirement, “the<br />

facts required to be pleaded and proved under section 10(b) are significantly different from the<br />

facts that give rise to section 18 claims.”<br />

Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Tech. Inc., 801 F. Supp.2d 41 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).<br />

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of<br />

1934 because: (i) Comverse’s SEC filings stated that the company complied with GAAP when in<br />

fact the company was improperly accounting for stock options and (ii) the company announced<br />

that it would be become current in its SEC filings by the end of 2007 but thereafter failed to do<br />

so. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the latter category of claims<br />

because the allegations were based on forward-looking statements protected by the Private<br />

Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act. The court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the<br />

C.6<br />

C.6<br />

117

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