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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Mortgage Asset Securitization Trans., Inc., 2011<br />

WL 4550191 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2011).<br />

The district court granted (without prejudice) defendants’ motion to dismiss an amended<br />

class action complaint alleging violation of, inter alia, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,<br />

arising from alleged misstatements and omissions concerning mortgage-backed securities<br />

(including alleged deviation from loan underwriting guidelines, loan-to-value ratios, debt-toincome<br />

ratios, appraisal standards and procedures, and income, employment and credit history<br />

verification processes). The court dismissed the amended class action complaint because<br />

plaintiffs failed to comply with the particularized pleading requirements of Section 13 of the<br />

Securities Act, which sets out the statutes of limitations and repose applicable to Securities Act<br />

claims. Plaintiffs were directed to replead with particularized facts concerning the timeliness of<br />

their claims, including but not limited to the time and circumstances of discovering the<br />

defendants’ allegedly actionable statements, the reason why discovery was not made earlier, or<br />

the diligent efforts undertaken in making such discovery. The court exercised its discretion to<br />

grant leave to amend because doing so would not be “futile”.<br />

In re Franklin Bank Corp. Sec. Litig., 782 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D. Tex. 2011).<br />

The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice a<br />

consolidated class action lawsuit alleging violation of, inter alia, Section 11 of the Securities Act<br />

of 1933, arising from Franklin Bank’s management and strategy practices that allegedly resulted<br />

in its closure and liquidation. After applying the pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil<br />

Procedure 8 (and rejecting defendant’s argument that allegations of recklessness are tantamount<br />

to fraud), the court dismissed with prejudice the Section 11 claim against the underwriter<br />

defendant because it was based on an SEC filing and its attendant public announcement that<br />

were not included in the registration statement at issue, and because the alleged misstatements<br />

and omissions were not alleged to have been known at the time the registration statement was<br />

issued and distributed. The Section 11 claim was also dismissed because an impact of .46% on<br />

total interest income, 1.4% on net interest income, and 1.78% on interest income after credit<br />

losses was insufficient to establish materiality as a matter of law. The court declined to consider<br />

financial impacts that were material for timeframes not relevant to the Section 11 claims. The<br />

court declined to find plaintiffs’ claims time-barred because the alleged “storm warnings”<br />

identified by defendants did not address the time period relevant to the Section 11 claim.<br />

Indiana State Dist. Council of Laborers v. Omnicare, Inc., 2011 WL 2786301 (E.D. Ky. July 14,<br />

2011).<br />

The district court disposed of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 that<br />

was remanded from the Sixth Circuit (because the district court had improperly dismissed the<br />

B.1<br />

B.1<br />

B.1<br />

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