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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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of the class action suit. The district court granted defendant’s motion, ruling that plaintiffs had<br />

expressly released all of their arbitration claims as a result of failing to timely opt-out of the class<br />

action settlement. In determining the scope of the arbitration agreement on appeal, the Second<br />

Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision that defendant is liberated from its requirement to<br />

arbitrate released claims as defined in the class action settlement agreement. However, the<br />

Second Circuit noted that defendant still agreed to arbitrate both non-released claims and claims<br />

expressly excluded from the release, pursuant to the original arbitration agreement. Such claims<br />

were included in the FINRA action. Therefore, the Second Circuit vacated this portion of the<br />

district court’s ruling, holding that the district court may not enjoin plaintiff from arbitrating<br />

these claims before FINRA.<br />

Filho v. Safra Nat’l Bank, 797 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).<br />

Plaintiff alleged that representatives of defendant invested his money inappropriately in<br />

risky securities without his approval. defendant responded with a motion to compel arbitration<br />

pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties. Plaintiff contended that defendant<br />

modified the terms and conditions of the account agreement after Plaintiff agreed thereto, and<br />

that he never received nor read the original contract terms and conditions or the terms and<br />

conditions as later modified. The court held that there was a valid “change of terms” clause in<br />

the original agreement and that, if properly implemented and agreed upon, the change was not a<br />

contract modification as contemplated by New York’s General Obligation Law. Therefore, no<br />

additional consideration was required to support the modification to the agreement. The court<br />

further concluded that plaintiff’s allegation that he did not receive or read the contract was<br />

contradicted by the acknowledgement above plaintiff’s signature on the original account<br />

agreement that he received, understood, and agreed to the contract. The court further held that<br />

the issues plaintiff raised were within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and thus granted<br />

defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.<br />

Velez v. Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).<br />

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants based on alleged violations of the Fair<br />

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The parties did not dispute that Plaintiff signed an employment<br />

agreement providing that all disputes shall be settled and determined by arbitration. Plaintiff<br />

sought designation of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 216. Defendants<br />

then moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, compel arbitration. The trial court<br />

considered the issue of whether these claims were eligible for arbitration based on FINRA Rule<br />

13024, which precludes arbitration of class action claims. The court held that collective actions<br />

are separate and distinct from class actions because they are “opt-in” actions, whereas class<br />

actions require participants to “opt-out.” The court granted defendants’ motion to compel<br />

arbitration on the basis that the FLSA “collective action” is not encompassed within the term<br />

“class action” and therefore was eligible for arbitration under the FINRA rules.<br />

N.1<br />

N.1<br />

332

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