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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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O.5<br />

Moomjy v. HQ Sustainable Maritime Indus., Inc., 2011 WL 4048792 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12,<br />

2011).<br />

Corporate and individual defendants moved for a stay of discovery in a pending state<br />

court derivative action, claiming that permitting such discovery would violate the Private<br />

Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act of 1995. The court granted the motions, holding that all three<br />

pertinent factors--(1) the risk of federal plaintiffs obtaining the state plaintiff’s discovery; (2) the<br />

extent of factual and legal overlap between the state and federal actions; and (3) the burden of<br />

state court discovery on the defendants---weighed in favor of imposing a stay.<br />

P. Failure to Supervise<br />

1. SEC Enforcement Actions<br />

P.1<br />

In re Investment Placement Group, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-14677, SEC Release No. 34-66055,<br />

2011 SEC LEXIS 4547 (Dec. 23, 2011).<br />

Respondent Gonzolez-Rubio, the Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of IPG, the<br />

respondent broker-dealer, was responsible for supervising the trading room, including overseeing<br />

the activities of a trader who engaged in a fraudulent interpositioning scheme involving a<br />

Mexican investment advisor and a separate Mexican brokerage firm. The trader was found to<br />

have violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and<br />

Rule 10b-5 thereunder, to the detriment of for Mexican pension funds that were institutional<br />

clients of the Mexican brokerage firm. As a result of the trader’s fraud, the pension funds<br />

overpaid for certain credit-linked notes by approximately $65 million. The firm and the trader<br />

each earned more than $6 million as part of the scheme.<br />

The SEC alleged that the scheme went undetected by the firm because the firm failed to<br />

establish adequate policies and procedures and a system for implementation that would<br />

reasonably be expected to prevent and detect interpositioning. The firms written procedures<br />

merely listed interpositioning as a prohibited activity, but had no procedures for reviewing<br />

transactions to monitory them for suspicious activity. The COO delegated supervisory<br />

responsibility for the trading to the trader, which effectively resulted in the trader supervising<br />

himself. In addition, the COO failed to respond to red flags regarding the scheme, including<br />

what the SEC order referred to as a “dramatic” rise in revenue resulting from the interpositioned<br />

transactions. The COO also failed to follow-up on his discovery that the Mexican brokerage<br />

firm who played a part in the scheme had been receiving 78% of the markups in the firm’s<br />

proprietary trading account generated from trades executed on behalf of the Mexican brokerage<br />

firm’s clients.<br />

The firm and the COO consented to findings that they failed reasonably to supervise the<br />

trader with a view to detecting and preventing his violations. As a result, the firm consented to a<br />

378

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