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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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M.1<br />

SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).<br />

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the SEC’s claims were<br />

not time barred. The SEC sued the defendants under Section 21A of the Securities Exchange<br />

Act of 1934. The defendants argued that the SEC’s claims were time barred because the fiveyear<br />

limitations period for claims under Section 21A is a statute of repose, not a statute of<br />

limitations. The court rejected this argument, holding that it was a statute of limitations because<br />

it “is clearly a limitation on one of several ‘remedies’ the SEC may seek for insider trading,” not<br />

a limitation on the SEC’s right to sue.<br />

In re Franklin Bank Corp. Secs. Litig., 782 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D. Tex. 2011).<br />

The court denied, in part, a defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the<br />

Securities Act of 1933 on statute of limitations grounds. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant<br />

made untrue statement or material omissions in a May 2006 registration statement for the<br />

offering of bank stock. The defendant argued that plaintiffs had constructive notice of the claims<br />

more than a year before filing the action.<br />

The court found that plaintiffs did not have constructive notice of the claim until August<br />

2008, when the bank whose stock was at issue in the dispute first reported the need to file<br />

restatements covering the 2006 time period. Because plaintiffs brought their claim within one<br />

year of this notice, the action was timely.<br />

La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. KPMG <strong>LLP</strong>, 2011 WL 4629299 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2011).<br />

The court held that the two-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (b)(1) did not<br />

bar the plaintiff’s claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934<br />

and Rule 10b–5. Applying Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, __ US __, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010), the<br />

court held that neither the filing of a prior lawsuit nor the public record triggered the statute of<br />

limitations because they did not reveal “facts constituting the violation” (in this case, facts<br />

indicating scienter) under Merck. The court also held, however, that any allegations that a<br />

defendant participated in the alleged fraud that preceded June 30, 2005 (five years prior to the<br />

filing of the complaint) were barred by the five-year statute of repose under 28 U.S.C. § 1658<br />

(b)(2).<br />

Antelis v. Freeman, 799 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Ill. 2011).<br />

The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on statute of<br />

limitation grounds. The plaintiff alleged that his former business partner violated the Securities<br />

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