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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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C.2<br />

Dixon v. Ladish Company, Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 746 (E.D.Wis. 2011)<br />

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted defendants’ motion<br />

to dismiss claims alleged by plaintiff, Dixon, for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the<br />

Securities Exchange Act. The plaintiff also asserts a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, arising<br />

under Wisconsin law. Defendants contend that the plaintiff’s claims arising under Section 14(a)<br />

must fail because the claims are not plead with the particularity required under the Private<br />

Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act (“PSLRA”).<br />

The claims arise from a merger agreement between Ladish Company Inc. (“Ladish”) and<br />

Allegheny Technologies, Inc. (“Allegheny”), in which Allegheny agreed to acquire Ladish. The<br />

court found that while the amended compliant alleged that the registration statement misstated<br />

and omitted material information; the complaint did not allege any specific facts to support the<br />

general allegations. The complaint also contained general allegations regarding the lack on<br />

information regarding Ladish’s decision to enter into, and subsequently approve of, the merger<br />

agreement with Allegheny. However, the court found that, without specific facts relating to how<br />

such an omission lead to misstatements, the claim failed under the requirements of the PSLRA.<br />

The court found this to be true regardless of whether the misstatements were material.<br />

SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134580 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011).<br />

On a motion to reconsider the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Section<br />

14(a) claim, the court held that Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct.<br />

2296 (2011), did not apply to Section 14(a) claims. The Supreme Court in Janus decided that<br />

“[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate<br />

authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” Id.<br />

at 2302. The court noted that Section 14(a), however, “proscribe[s] the solicitation of proxies<br />

‘by means of’ false or misleading statements.” Mercury Interactive, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS<br />

134580, at *8 (quoting Section 14(a)). Because Section 14(a) is not limited to those situations in<br />

which someone “makes a statement,” that is, the language that the Janus Court construed, Janus<br />

does not apply to Section 14(a) claims.<br />

SEC v. Zhenyu Ni, Case No. CV-11-0708 DMR, SEC Litig. Rel. No. 21859 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 16,<br />

2011).<br />

The Commission brought suit alleging, inter alia, that defendant had violated Section<br />

14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3 thereunder by trading in shares of Bare Escentuals,<br />

Inc., after overhearing confidential communications suggesting upcoming merger while sitting in<br />

the office of his sister, who was then Director of Tax at Bare. The Commission also alleged<br />

violations of Sections 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Defendant<br />

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