04.01.2014 Views

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

3. Aiding & Abetting<br />

H.3<br />

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).<br />

Investors filed a private action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of<br />

1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder against a mutual fund advisor and its parent fund<br />

creator. The investors alleged that the mutual fund advisor and mutual fund parent aided and<br />

abetted violations of Rule 10b-5 for alleged false statements in the mutual fund prospectuses<br />

filed by the mutual fund. At issue was the meaning of the word “make” in Rule 10b-5. In<br />

holding that the “maker” of a statement for Rule 10b-5 purposes is the person or entity with<br />

ultimate authority and control over the statement, the court relied on its previous ruling that a<br />

private right of action under Rule 10b-5 does not include suits against aiders and abettors who<br />

contribute substantial assistance to the making of a statement, but do not actually make it. Thus,<br />

the court held that the mutual fund advisor and the mutual fund parent were not liable for aiding<br />

and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5 because the mutual fund itself “made” the false statements<br />

in the prospectuses.<br />

MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011).<br />

Plaintiff investors sued defendants, a broker-dealer and its subsidiary bank, alleging<br />

conspiracy to violate RICO. The investors claimed that defendants conspired with Bernard L.<br />

Madoff to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme by failing to freeze Madoff’s accounts after defendants<br />

allegedly become aware of the fraud as a result of a “due diligence” investigation conducted by<br />

defendants. Plaintiffs argued that an exception should be created to Section 1964(c) of the<br />

Private Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), which bars civil RICO claims<br />

predicated on allegations of securities fraud, because securities fraud laws do not create private<br />

cause of action for aiding and abetting, thus foreclosing plaintiffs’ avenue for relief. Defendants<br />

moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of<br />

Civil Procedure, arguing that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead the required elements of<br />

their claims. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety. The Court of<br />

Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims, but on different grounds for plaintiffs’ civil<br />

RICO claim. The Court of Appeals held that Section 1964(c) of the PSLRA bars civil RICO<br />

claims predicated on acts of securities fraud even where a plaintiff cannot itself pursue a private<br />

cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud against a defendant.<br />

SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2011).<br />

The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against defendants, a fund<br />

portfolio manager and a fund advisor’s chief operating officer (“COO”), alleging violations of<br />

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Investment<br />

Advisors Act of 1940. The SEC alleged that a mutual fund’s Registered Investment Advisor<br />

secretly permitted one investor to “market time” the fund in exchange for an investment in a<br />

H.3<br />

H.3<br />

267

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!