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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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f. Affirmative Defenses<br />

Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 5515958 (2nd Cir. 2011).<br />

C.1.f<br />

Investors brought a class action against Merrill Lynch alleging securities fraud in<br />

violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 related to auction rate securities (“ARS”)<br />

purchases. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant engaged in a scheme to manipulate the ARS market<br />

by using its own capital to place bids in order to prevent auction failures. The district court<br />

entered an order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss and investor appealed. On appeal,<br />

defendant argued that it had made various public disclosures of its ARS auction practices,<br />

several of which were the result of an SEC investigation. In evaluating plaintiffs’ market<br />

manipulation claims, the court found that Second Circuit case law clearly required a showing<br />

that an alleged manipulator engaged in market activity aimed at deceiving investors as to how<br />

other market participants had valued a security. The case law was less clear as to when<br />

disclosures were sufficient to negate a claim that a certain market practice is manipulative. In<br />

addressing the disclosures, the court recognized the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, which provided<br />

protection to someone who adequately warned investors of certain risks. However, the court<br />

noted that cautionary words about future risk cannot insulate one from liability for the failure to<br />

disclose that the risk has already transpired. Nonetheless, the court, in affirming the district<br />

court, held that Merrill’s disclosures were adequate to defeat the allegation that its practices<br />

amounted to a market manipulation.<br />

U.S. v. Behrens, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14294 (8th Cir. July 13, 2011).<br />

C.1.f<br />

Defendants pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to, inter alia, the violation of Rule<br />

10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 brought in an enforcement action. Defendants<br />

were sentenced to serve jail time. At the sentencing hearing, Defendants asserted the “noknowledge”<br />

provision as an affirmative defense. Under the no-knowledge provision, a defendant<br />

is not subject to imprisonment if he or she proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or<br />

regulation. The district court held that, as a matter of law, pleading guilty to a statutory offense<br />

prevents a defendant from asserting the no-knowledge defense. On appeal, the Eight Circuit<br />

reversed and remanded, holding that the government must prove that a person “willfully”<br />

violated Rule 10b-5 prior to that person being imprisoned. Pleading guilty does not, as a matter<br />

of law, prevent a defendant from asserting the no-knowledge defense. Accordingly, the district<br />

court erred by holding defendants could not have asserted the no-knowledge defense.<br />

Goldenson v. Steffens, 802 F. Supp.2d 240 (D. Maine 2011).<br />

C.1.f<br />

Investors brought action against investment firms and managers for, inter alia, Section<br />

10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations arising out of recommendation made in connection with a hedge<br />

fund. Defendants allegedly made these recommendations verbally and through confidential<br />

offering memoranda. Plaintiffs alleged that the hedge fund was merely a feeder fund for the<br />

Madoff fund. Defendants made a motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, defendants argued<br />

83

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