Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

ased on a number of public documents, more than one year before filing their claim and that
their claims were therefore time barred under 15 U.S.C. § 77m. The court found that the news
stories on which defendants relied would not give a reasonable plaintiff notice that the offering
documents at issue contained material misstatements and omissions. Because the evidence did
not establish that plaintiffs should have discovered the violation more than a year before filing
the complaint, the action was timely.
The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the additional Section 12(a)(2)
claims asserted by plaintiffs after the filing of the complaint did not relate back to the original
complaint. The court held that the claims related back to the original filing for statute of
limitations purposes because the claims relied on the same core factual allegations contained in
the initial complaint.
In re IndyMac Mortg.-Backed Secs. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
In this putative class action, the court held that although tolling may be invoked to avoid
the one-year statute of limitations applicable to certain claims under the Securities Act of 1933,
the three-year statute of repose could not be tolled. After consolidating two cases brought by the
state and municipal retirement systems against the defendant, the court appointed a lead plaintiff
who, without objection, filed a consolidated complaint that named itself as the only plaintiff.
The court later held that this plaintiff lacked standing to sue with respect to certain mortgage
pass-through certificates, and the other retirement systems moved to intervene in order to cure
the standing deficiency.
The court determined that the statute of repose had expired on most of the claims that the
proposed intervenors sought to assert. All the claims were timely when the initial suits were
filed, but the proposed intervenors abandoned their own claims by allowing the lead plaintiff to
proceed as the only plaintiff. Since the statute of repose by its terms allows no exceptions, the
court denied leave to intervene to assert claims based on offerings that took place more than
three years before the relevant motion to intervene.
For claims not barred by the statute of repose, the court determined that the applicable
statute of limitations should be tolled. The court held that the tolling doctrine of American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (where under certain circumstances, the
commencement of a class action tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations for all
class members) applied even where the putative class plaintiff had no standing to assert the
claims at issue.
In re Lehman Bros. Secs. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The court denied in part motions by two putative intervenors who sought to intervene as
plaintiffs in a class action to assert claims under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of
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