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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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O.1<br />

SEC v. Carroll, 2011 WL 5880875 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2011).<br />

The SEC accused several defendants of insider trading, and they responded by filing<br />

individual motions to dismiss. One of the defendants argued that the SEC failed to supply a<br />

specific description of the alleged inside information, but the court rejected this argument,<br />

finding that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements were relaxed where facts are peculiarly within<br />

the knowledge of defendants. Another defendant argued that the SEC’s scienter allegations were<br />

insufficient, but the court held that Rule 9(b) permitted general allegations as to state of mind,<br />

finding that the SEC should not be held to the higher standard imposed on private litigants by the<br />

Private Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act of 1995.<br />

SEC v. Steffes, 2011 WL 3418305 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2011).<br />

The SEC brought an enforcement action against employees, alleging that they engaged in<br />

insider trading by disseminating non-public information to family members regarding the<br />

company’s pending acquisition. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the court denied the<br />

motion, holding that the SEC sufficiently alleged misappropriation of material non-public<br />

information, breach of fiduciary duty, and scienter, all with the particularity required by Rule<br />

9(b). Though the defendants admittedly were not involved in the merger negotiations, the SEC<br />

claimed that they pieced the situation together for themselves based on information that was<br />

available to them as employees, and the complaint identified with the requisite particularity what<br />

information the employees used to reach the conclusion that the company was being sold. The<br />

employees also pointed to the complaint’s failure to identify the dates and times of the phone<br />

calls they allegedly made to family members to discuss the misappropriated information, or the<br />

specific contents of the conversations, but the court found that the SEC’s allegation that the<br />

suspicious trading immediately followed such phone calls sufficed to support a reasonable<br />

inference that the calls involved misappropriation. The court also concluded that several prior<br />

decisions involving the SEC and referencing the “strong inference” standard with respect to<br />

scienter did not mean that the Private Securities <strong>Litigation</strong> Reform Act of 1995 standard applied<br />

to the SEC, and instead held that Rule 9(b) allows scienter to be alleged generally.<br />

Teamsters Local 617 Pension and Welfare Funds v. Apollo Group, Inc., 2011 WL 1253250 (D.<br />

Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011).<br />

Plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action against defendant Apollo Group, Inc., and a<br />

group of its officers and directors, accusing the defendants of improperly backdating stock option<br />

grants. The district court had previously dismissed with leave to amend, and after the plaintiffs<br />

filed their Second Amended Complaint, the defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that the<br />

complaint failed to plead backdating with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). The court<br />

agreed, finding that no reasonable inference of backdating could be drawn as to those grants that<br />

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