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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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warranted under these circumstances because of the self-concealing nature of the defendants’<br />

conduct.<br />

Special Situations Fund III, L.P. v. Am. Dental Partners, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D. Mass.<br />

2011).<br />

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, holding that the plaintiffs’<br />

claims under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were barred by the one-year<br />

statute of limitations. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that their claims were tolled under<br />

American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held<br />

that the filing of a class-action lawsuit tolls the statute of limitations for putative class members.<br />

The court determined that because the class action on which the plaintiffs relied for tolling<br />

involved a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and not a claim under Section 18(a),<br />

American Pipe tolling did not apply. The court held that the legal standards for proving Section<br />

18 and Section 10(b) claims are “sufficiently distinct” that filing a class action alleging a<br />

violation of Section 10(b) did not toll the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ Section 18 claim.<br />

Mass. Bricklayers & Mason Funds v. Deutsche Alt-A Secs., 273 F.R.D. 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).<br />

The court denied a bank’s motion to intervene as a plaintiff in a class action because its<br />

claim was time barred. The bank purchased securities, which were offered in 2006, in December<br />

2007. It sought to intervene in the class action on January 11, 2011, more than three years after<br />

the offering. The applicable three-year statute of repose for claims under the Securities Act of<br />

1933 barred the claim, unless tolling applied.<br />

The court held that the tolling doctrine of American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.<br />

538 (1974) (where under certain circumstances, the commencement of a class action tolls the<br />

running of the applicable statute of limitations for all class members, even where class status is<br />

later denied) did not apply because the bank was not a member of the originally named class,<br />

which included only those who purchased securities between May 2006 and May 2007. The<br />

bank did not purchase its securities until December 2007, therefore the tolling rule was<br />

inapplicable.<br />

Plumbers’ & Pipefitters’ Local No. 562 Supplemental Plan v. J.P. Morgan Acceptance Corp. I,<br />

2011 WL 6182121 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011).<br />

The court denied, in part, the defendants’ motion to dismiss because plaintiffs’ claims<br />

under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 were timely filed and because<br />

additional claims under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act that were added later related back<br />

to the filing of the original complaint. Defendants argued that plaintiffs had constructive notice,<br />

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