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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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permit exercise of personal jurisdiction. The company was not a resident of the state, had no<br />

office there, did not regularly conduct business there, and had no accounts or assets in the state.<br />

Likewise, the individual defendants had never been North Carolina residents and had no assets in<br />

the state. Their contacts with the forum were limited to correspondence, a few business<br />

meetings, and trips to the state unrelated to the subject matter of the suit. The court found that<br />

the plaintiffs had failed to make out a prima facie case of general personal jurisdiction, and their<br />

proposed discovery would not alter the analysis of the issue.<br />

Nexbank, SSB v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2011 WL 5182118 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2011).<br />

Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in Texas state court asserting claims under state<br />

common and statutory law and federal securities law arising out of the plaintiff’s purchase of<br />

three mortgage-backed securities from the defendants. The defendants removed the case to<br />

federal court based on both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved to<br />

remand and the court granted the motion, concluding that the claim under the Securities Act of<br />

1933 was not removable under 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a), and the claims under the Securities<br />

Exchange Act of 1934 were not separate and independent, and therefore the court lacked subject<br />

matter jurisdiction. Back in state court, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment as<br />

to the Securities Act claim, which the state court granted. Thereafter, the defendants removed<br />

the case to federal court a second time, and the plaintiff again moved to remand. The court<br />

granted the motion, holding that the second removal violated the “voluntary-involuntary rule,”<br />

which provides that a case that is not removable on the initial pleadings may only become<br />

removable pursuant to a voluntary act of the plaintiff. Because the summary judgment on the<br />

Securities Act claim granted by the state court, which erased the initial impediment to removal,<br />

resulted from the defendants’ actions, not the plaintiff’s, the case remained non-removable and<br />

remand was warranted.<br />

KBR, Inc. v. Chevedden, 776 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D. Tex. 2011).<br />

In a declaratory judgment action brought by a corporation seeking a declaration that it<br />

could exclude a retail investor’s proposal in proxy materials for its annual shareholders meeting,<br />

the defendant-investor moved to transfer venue from Houston to California. The court found<br />

that the litigation arose out of letters the defendant sent to Houston asking for his proposal to be<br />

included in the proxy materials, and therefore venue was proper in Houston. In denying the<br />

motion to transfer, the court concluded that the defendant failed to show that a California venue<br />

was clearly more convenient, as the case raised a legal issue that would be resolved on the papers<br />

without the need for court appearances, rendering the parties’ relative financial burdens largely<br />

irrelevant.<br />

O.4<br />

O.4<br />

371

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