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Broker-Dealer Litigation - Greenberg Traurig LLP

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inadequate representation. Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff had notice of the prior<br />

action and failed to intervene. As such, the court granted Hurst’s motion to amend, and granted<br />

summary judgment in Hurst’s favor.<br />

Klawonn v. YA Global Investments, L.P., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88535 (D. N.J., Aug. 10, 2011).<br />

Plaintiff alleged that defendant earned short-swing profits from trading in the stock of a<br />

public company under a variety of theories under which defendant would be treated as a<br />

statutory insider by virtue of beneficial ownership of more than ten percent of the company’s<br />

common stock. The court considered the allegations under an amended complaint, designed to<br />

remedy deficiencies concerning the beneficial ownership allegations in the original complaint.<br />

Defendant argued that conversion caps were in place for all the relevant securities agreements<br />

that plaintiff relied upon to establish ten percent ownership, which limited defendant’s voting<br />

rights 4.99 percent. Plaintiff, in turn, argued that the caps were ineffective for various reasons,<br />

both factual and legal.<br />

The court rejected theories that the conversion caps were ineffective based on theories that: (a)<br />

voting rights conferred to defendant by a convertible series of stock established greater than ten<br />

percent beneficial ownership; (b) defendant was the beneficial owner of the stock held in<br />

“escrow” by a third party; (c) the conversion caps should be deemed illusory, based on the<br />

position taken by the SEC an amicus brief filed in a different case; and (d) SEC Rule 13d-3(b),<br />

which prohibits the use of agreement as part of a plan or scheme to evade reporting<br />

requirements, rendered the caps invalid. The court, however, found that the claim based a<br />

waiver of the conversion caps as to certain convertible debentures, caused by the company’s<br />

registration-related defaults, was sufficient to state a plausibly viable claim, and allowed the case<br />

to proceed solely on that theory. As such, the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied<br />

in part.<br />

C.4<br />

5. Section 17<br />

C.5<br />

SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F.Supp.2d 340 (S.D.N.Y 2011).<br />

This case concerns an alleged fraudulent securities offering by virtue of false and<br />

misleading offering memoranda. The material statements and omissions were charged as<br />

violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The SEC also<br />

alleged that one of the defendants (who served as counsel to one of the broker-dealer defendants)<br />

aided and abetted the brokerage firm’s violation of Section 17(a). In a prior decision, the court<br />

found that the evidence was insufficient to establish substantial aiding and abetting liability, but<br />

directed the SEC to inform the court if it had additional evidence, indicating the court’s intention<br />

to grant summary judgment against the defendant. SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 2009 U.S.<br />

Dist. LEXIS 119869 at *5 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 22, 2009). The SEC provided no new evidence in<br />

support of its renewed motion for summary judgment on the Section 17 claim, and thus, the court<br />

granted summary judgment in favor of the individual counsel defendant. In so doing, the court<br />

116

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