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P:\CLEPUB\Books\Disciplinary Board Reporter ... - Oregon State Bar

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Cite as In re Goyak, 19 DB Rptr 179 (2005)<br />

rather than an individual does not minimize the offense. The Accused violated DR<br />

1-102(A)(2).<br />

Under In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 801 P2d 818 (1990), failure to respond to<br />

inquiries from Disciplinary Counsel’s Office is a violation of DR 1-103(C). The<br />

evidence Accused did not respond to inquiries from Disciplinary Counsel’s Office to<br />

such an extent that the matter had to be referred to an LPRC for further investigation.<br />

After the LPRC returned the matter to Disciplinary Counsel’s Office, the Accused<br />

failed to produce the bank records the <strong>Bar</strong> requested for over a year, ultimately<br />

requiring the issuance of a subpoena for the records to the Accused’s banks.<br />

When the Accused signed and filed his Answer in April 2004, he admitted the<br />

allegations of paragraph 10 of the Formal Complaint (also paragraph 10 of the<br />

Amended Formal Complaint), which alleges that he failed to respond to Disciplinary<br />

Counsel’s inquiries in the year 2000, and admitted that this conduct violated DR<br />

1-103(C). He readopted that answer at the time of hearing in response to the<br />

amended complaint.<br />

Under <strong>Oregon</strong> evidence law, the Accused’s factual admissions in his Answer<br />

are admissible as evidence against him. Yates v. Large, 284 Or 217, 223, 585 P2d<br />

697 (1978). The Supreme Court has determined that the type of recalcitrance the<br />

Accused has admittedly displayed during the course of Disciplinary Counsel’s<br />

investigation violates DR 1-103(C). In re Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 939 P2d 39 (1997).<br />

The Accused has admitted this violation, and the Trial Panel finds that he violated<br />

the rule.<br />

The Accused has admitted in both Case No. 03-119 and Case No. 03-120 that<br />

between 1998 and June 2002, he deposited and maintained his personal funds in his<br />

lawyer trust account. By its terms, this rule does not require proof of a culpable<br />

mental state. 2 Therefore, even though the Accused claims he did not know he should<br />

not deposit personal funds into his client trust account or use the account for personal<br />

business, Supreme Court precedent and the language of DR 9-101(A) demonstrate<br />

that he has, nonetheless, violated this rule. The Accused admits the violations, and<br />

the Trial Panel finds that he violated DR 9-101(A) in both Case No. 03-119 and Case<br />

No. 03-120.<br />

2<br />

While the court has not gone so far as to declare DR 9-101(A) to be a strict liability<br />

rule, it has held lawyers responsible for trust account mismanagement by employees about<br />

which the lawyer did not know. See In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 337, 952 P2d 1017 (1998),<br />

and the cases cited in footnote 3 therein. Ignorance that his conduct violated a disciplinary<br />

rule does not excuse the Accused’s conduct. In re Carey, 307 Or 315, 321, 767 P2d 438<br />

(1989).<br />

187

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