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Cite as In re Ryan, 19 DB Rptr 41 (2005)
billed her clients a total of about one hour for the legal work performed on April 25,
1997. This work constituted the unauthorized practice of law by the Accused, and she
knew it. The Accused then left on vacation and was away until May 6, 1997.
On May 6, 1997, the Accused returned to her law office. She reviewed the
mail delivered to her law office while she was away on vacation. She worked on
three pending cases. The mail she reviewed included mail regarding legal matters she
represented clients on. The legal work she did consisted mainly of dictating
documents for her secretary to type later. Specifically, the Accused drafted two letters
to two clients and drafted two other letters to two opposing lawyers. She also
discussed one case at length with her secretary. She billed her clients a total of 2.20
hours for the legal work done on May 6, 1997. This work constituted the
unauthorized practice of law by the Accused, and she knew it.
On May 8, 1997, the Accused attended a deposition, met with clients, worked
on a memorandum, and called other lawyers on behalf of her clients. She billed her
clients 4.5 hours for the work. All of the work occurred after the Accused had
submitted her petition for reinstatement to the Bar, along with her PLF premium and
reinstatement fee. She hand-delivered those materials to the Bar at about 8:00 a.m.
on May 8, 1997. The Accused contends that she thought she was allowed to practice
law as soon as she delivered the petition, PLF premium and reinstatement fee to the
Bar. In fact, the Accused was not reinstated to practice law until on May 9, 1997.
We find the Accused’s belief that she was instantly reinstated to be
unreasonable for at least two reasons. First, the Accused had reviewed a Bar
memorandum regarding reinstatement procedures. The memorandum stated that
applicants for reinstatement from suspensions over financial matters “should expect
to be notified of their reinstatement within two weeks of the filing of the [petition
for reinstatement].” This suggests that reinstatement from an administrative
suspension is neither automatic nor immediate. The second factor showing the
unreasonableness of the asserted belief is the petition the Accused filled out in
support of her request for reinstatement. The petition is addressed to the Bar’s
Executive Director, it contains a statement that the petitioner is “seeking
reinstatement” to the Bar, and it has a signature block for the Executive Director to
sign indicating that the petitioner is “hereby reinstated” as a member of the Bar. A
reasonable person would conclude from these facts that the Bar’s Executive Director
must grant a request for reinstatement before the person requesting reinstatement can
lawfully engage in the practice of law following the submission of a petition for
reinstatement from a financial suspension. The legal work the Accused performed on
May 8, 1997, constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and she knew it.
From April 16 to May 8, 1997, the Accused never genuinely believed she was
authorized to practice law. She hoped she would find a way to nullify the suspension
or to legitimately practice law while she appealed the suspension, but from April 16
to the time she submitted her sworn statement in support of her petition for
reinstatement on May 8, 1997, the Accused never genuinely believed she was
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