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Cite as In re Tuttle, 19 DB Rptr 216 (2005)
“(1) the misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds;
“(2) the misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice
to a client or other person;
“(3) the respondent has been publicly disciplined in the last three years;
“(4) the misconduct is of the same nature as misconduct for which the
respondent has been disciplined in the last five years;
“(5) the misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation
by the respondent;
“(6) the misconduct constitutes a “serious crime’ as defined in Rule 19(C);
or
“(7) the misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct.” (Emphasis
added.)
In evaluating whether the Accused’s actions “shall not” constitute lesser
misconduct, Rule 9B(2) applies. The trial panel finds that the Accused’s conduct
resulted in or was likely to result in substantial prejudice to Mr. Ford.
Additionally, three provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (Amended 1992) (hereinafter called “ABA Standards”) particularly apply
in the present case:
Rule 1.22, which provides, in pertinent part:
“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or
governmental position knowingly fails to follow proper procedures or rules
and causes injuries or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the
legal process.”
Rule 6.12, which provides, in pertinent part:
“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows . . . that material
information is improperly being withheld and takes no remedial action and
causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding or causes
an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
Rule 7.2, which provides, in pertinent part:
“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury
or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system.”
In violating DR 7-103(B), the Accused violated her duties to the public, the
legal system, and to the profession. Although the Accused may initially have acted
negligently, once she realized that she had a duty to disclose Ricks’ statements to
Ford’s defense counsel on the morning of the trial, she knowingly failed to do so.
The Accused had a conscious awareness of the nature and attendant circumstances
of the exculpatory evidence voiced by Ricks. She knew well her public duty to
disclose that information in a timely fashion to Ford’s defense lawyer Ferder.
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