P:\CLEPUB\Books\Disciplinary Board Reporter ... - Oregon State Bar

Cite as In re Idiart, 19 DB Rptr 316 (2005)
STIPULATION FOR DISCIPLINE
Damian M. Idiart, attorney at law (hereinafter “the Accused”), and the Oregon
State Bar (hereinafter “the Bar”) hereby stipulate to the following matters pursuant
to Oregon State Bar Rule of Procedure 3.6(c).
1.
The Bar was created and exists by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon
and is, and at all times mentioned herein was, authorized to carry out the provisions
of ORS Chapter 9, relating to the discipline of lawyers.
2.
The Accused was admitted by the Oregon Supreme Court to the practice of
law in Oregon on April 20, 2001, and has been a member of the Oregon State Bar
continuously since that time, having his office and place of business in Jackson
County, Oregon.
3.
The Accused enters into this Stipulation for Discipline freely and voluntarily.
This Stipulation for Discipline is made under the restrictions of Bar Rule of
Procedure 3.6(h).
4.
On August 12, 2005, the State Professional Responsibility Board (“SPRB”)
authorized formal disciplinary proceedings against the Accused for alleged violations
of RPC 5.3(b), RPC 7.3(b)(1), and RPC 8.4(a)(1) of the Oregon Rules of
Professional Conduct. The parties intend that this stipulation set forth all relevant
facts, violations, and the agreed-upon sanction as a final disposition of this
proceeding.
Facts
5.
Prior to May 2005, the Accused established a direct-mail solicitation
procedure, the day-to-day operation of which the Accused delegated to a nonlawyer
employee (“the employee”). The Accused instructed the employee: to review online
news reports about automobile accidents and to determine whether any dispute of
liability had been asserted or citations issued; if there were no dispute of liability or
if citations had been issued, to confirm that there were injuries for which recovery
could be sought; if there were such injuries, to contact the injured party to solicit
professional employment by sending a form letter previously drafted by the Accused.
The Accused did not instruct the employee that the Accused was prohibited from
soliciting professional employment by written communication when the Accused
knew or reasonably should known that the physical, emotional or mental state of the
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