American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

Ib) (1)
, Ib) (3)
OGA
TO~ SECRET tJMBRA
-
In 1948 CIA, in cooperation with a Department-of State organization called.OPC
(Office of Policy Coordination), began beaming/propaganda (some would say "news")
broadcasts toward the Soviet Bloc. The operation was called Voice ofAmerica, and it lived
a long and healthy life during the Cold War. Predictably, however, as soon as the VOA
stations went on the air, the Communist nations at which/they were targetted began
jamming the broadcasts. Thus ensued, in February of 1948, yet another area of intense
competition between CIA and thecryptologic community,
Tackling the problemofjamming would involve radi~ monitoring. CIA took on the job
in 1949 and immediately began preparing a plan to/identify and locate the jammers and
devise a solution./ln June 1950 an ad hoc group/of the lAC (Intelligence Advisory
Committee. chaired by the DCI) approved a/preliminary monitoring plan, called
I 1
Just how Admiral Stone ofAFSA found/out about it is not known, but it was hard to
keep secrets at the lAC level. In any case,Stone contacted the Department ofState (at the
time OPC was still officially part of State/rather than CIA) in July of 1950 to let them
know that he regarded this as an AFSA responsibility under NSCID 9. Hillenkoetter
justified CIA activity to AFSAC as/being performed under the section of the National
Security Act that permitted CIA to perform "such additional services of common concern
as the National Security Council.determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally...." This was a weak re.ed, and Hillenkoetter made his case even less plausible
by stating that monitoring fa.eilities so established could be used for other purposes in time
of war. Such a direct challenge to AFSA authority in COMINT brought a predictable
AFSAC response, and in November USCIB took up the issue. USCIB concluded in
November thatI // ~as a COMINT mission and should be headed by AFSA. A
USCIB study costed the problem at $5 million and 355 people. But when the matter went
before the NationalSecurity Council in early 1951, CIA won. The NSC directed that CIA
be the focal pointfor a multi-agency attack on the jammingproblem.
AFSA wro.te a supporting plan but continued to insist that it be given the mission.
When Canine became director, he took forceful exception to CIA encroachment in the
I ~ituation. But Canine was handicapped by limited resources.I ~as
going to be expensive, and when the SCAs were polled, they offered only part-time DF
facilities. NSA did not have the money to create a separate system just to monitor
jamming, and the military services contended that they could not provide the
communications to interlock a monitoring system anyway. So in February 1952 President
Truman approved a plan for CIA to proceed on its own.
HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT C
EMS JOINTLY
NOT RE
FOREIGN NATIONALS
102