American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 I ITh~ committee also recognized/the indivisability of COMINT\and ELINT and stressed the effort to fuse both sources into a/single report.Z But Robertson made plain that NSAmust be in the game for the long pull. The long pull was Sovie~ land he urged an all-out attack on the new! I systems introduced in the early 1950s. His committee recommended the development and deployment ofnew interceptl ~quipment.s The Hoover Commission The Hoover Commission was a far larger effort. Established by Eisenhower in 1954 and chaired by former president Herbert Hoover, it was at the time the most thorough reexamination of the federal government ever attempted. Hoover subcommittees delved into every cranny of the bureaucracy seeking improvements and economies. One such subcommittee was a task force chaired by General Mark Clark to investigate intelligence activities. The committee looked closely at NSA." The thrust of the Hoover Commission set the mold for all subsequent panels. Responding to the entreaties of Canine, it recommended increased authority for NSA in virtually every area of its operation. NSA should have the authority to prescribe equipment standards; it should prescribe all intercept and processing standards; it should inspect service cryptologic training and direct modifications as necessary. There was almost no area in which it did not feel that NSA should be further empowered. 5 What the panel did for NSA it also recommended for the SCAs. They should have more authority within their respective services, and each should be at the level of a major command. At the time only USAFSS was at that level, although ASA was granted major command status before the report was published. This left only NSG at a lower level within its service. It noted that "largely because of its status as a major command, the AFSS has developed a dynamic and promising program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technically qualified military career personnel.,,6 The committee noted the dismal record of the three services in assigning people to cryptologic posts, and it recommended that security strictures be changed to permit military personnel offices to understand the importance ofthe jobs. 7 More controversial was the panel's recommendation that NSA acquire additional authority over ELINT. Canine, who saw himself teetering over the black hole of interservice fighting, opposed this. He was having enough trouble unifying COMINT, without trying to swallow ELINT whole. USCIB noted that NSCID 17 had just been issued, and it urged that this new approach be tried before considering further integration of ELINT. (The impact of NSCID 17 will be discussed in chapter 7.)8 Clark and his committee proposed an all-out attack on Soviet high-grade ciphers, equivalent, in their words, to the Manhattan Project. It would require the best minds in 228
the country, equipped with the finest resources money could buy, but it would be worth it ifeven a portion ofthe Sovie~ Isystems were unlocked. Canine hailed the potential resource augmentation with glee, but cautioned against a total commitment before NSA had thoroughly analyzed the prospects for successs. USCIB supported him. 9 Cryptologic personnel requirements weighed heavily on the committee. Clark urged an improved grade structure, including the addition of supergrades, higher pay for consultants, improved assignment ofservice officer personnel, better perquisites for NSA people assigned overseas (to be the equivalent of those received by CIA), and NSA exemption from the Classification Act. To improve the revolving door nature of military intercept operators (few ofwhom stayed in the service past their initial enlistment), Clark urged the assignment ofcivilians to intercept positions overseas. 10 Clark andhis committee were concerned about two other potential problems. The first was the state of COMINT requirements, which were expressed in a document called the Master Requirements List. This, they said, was about the size of the Washington phone directory,/and about as specific. And since customers wanted COMINT to tell them everything, without narrowing the target further, NSA simply specified its own requirements. This had been going on so long that there was danger that the cryptologic community would become completely isolated from its customers and insensitive to them.11 What was occurring in requirements, they felt, was also true in security. COMINT security had become so tight that cryptologists were isolated from their customers. In time of war there was real danger that essential information would not get to the battlefield because of clearance restrictions. Thus the system would defeat itself and become a vestigial appendage. 12 It was a debate that would rage for years within the intelligence community. The Killian Board Eisenhower's preoccupation with the Soviet nuclear threat spawned a number of committees to look at American vulnerability. By far the most important of those was the Scientific Advisory Committee, commonly known as the Killian Board. In July of 1954 Eisenhower asked Dr. James R. Killian of MIT to head a study of the country's capability to warn ofsurprise attack. Killian named a panel of the elite from academia, the scientific community, and the military. Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 IffdiBbEl YIlt 'i'/rbBU'f RBYIf6LB e6MIN'f e6N'fft6L S"iS'fBTtfS 461N'fLY NOT REI E A ~ A AU '1'9 F8RBI8N ItA:'fI6I(*LS 229
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NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
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'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
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.§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
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'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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fepSEeRET~ Non - Responsive IOP3EeR
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T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
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TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
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'(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
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--------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
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Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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TOP5iCRET~ exacted revenge over a p
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lap 5fEftf'f ~BRA order to tighten
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1'011 S!CRET~ Government offices on
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Te"S!CREI~ were to continue to trai
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:rep 'I!!!CRE I U~RA Rowlett and Wi
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:rep Sl!eREru~ cryptanalysts, Lieut
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liaison office had maintained an of
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ..tOP §EERI!T~
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~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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lOP 5I!CREfij~RA Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
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fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
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OPSECREi tJM8itA to sink or swim on
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TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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T9P SECRET liMBIbIc When the ROK ar
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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lap SECRET l:JMBRA In early 1952 mu
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TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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lOP SIiEAET l::JMBRA Ib) (3) -P.L.
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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and he might have failed had he com
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Table 2
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Kim Philby strikes a smug pose duri
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cryptanalytic effort was gargantuan
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J.... .....,jl Printer seemed to be
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TOP SEcQriT liMBRA - (b) (1) (b)(3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Page 235 and 236: Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
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Page 253 and 254: ecommended special decentralization
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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