American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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Te"S!CREI~ were to continue to train at ASA schools and were to contribute instructors and financial support as soon as the Air Force had a budget of its own. Significantly, the Air Force assumed all responsibility for "the investigation for intelligence purposes of all types of electronic emissions relating to radar, radio control of guided missiles and pilotless aircraft, proximity fuses, electronic navigation systems, infrared equipment and related subjects." In other words, the Air Force was to take the ELINT and electronic warfare missions, which were at the time too new to even have a name. Needing equipment but not yet having a budget, the Air Force arranged for the transfer of equipment from the Army, which turned out to be cast-offreceivers and antennas that ASA no longer wanted. 15 On 20 October 1948, the new Air Force cryptologic organization was officially established as the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), still located at Arlington Hall. It was a major air command, responsible to neither intelligence nor communications. Thus from its earliest existence the Air Force accorded a loftier organizational position to its cryptologic service than did the other, more senior, services. And the Air Force did something else that was unprecedented. In May of 1949 it moved completely out of Washington. Security Service set up shop at Brooks Air Force Base outside of San Antonio, Texas. The move was calculated to remove USAFSS from geographical proximity to the central control authority for COMINT - at the time the Coordinator for Joint Operations, shortly to become the Armed Forces Security Agency. Thus USAFSS hoped to be insulated from any sort of outside control, which it regarded as bald interference in its affairs. 16 THECJO The lack of central control for COMINT was the most pressing problem of the postwar years. Cooler heads recognized that the uncoordinated and fractionalized efforts that had existed since the 1920s simply had to be better controlled. They had already agreed on a committee system, at that time called STANCIB and STANCICC. The committees could and did arrive at policy decisions which, in the case of unanimity of the board, were binding on the services. What was still lacking, though, was an executive organization to carry out the routine business ofcentral coordination. In early 1946 the Navy proposed such an executive body. They called it the Coordinator for Joint Operations, and it was to work out routine intercept coverage and processing responsibilities between the services. The Navy got Army concurrence, and on 15 February STANCIB approved the proposal. The Coordinator for Joint Operations, or CJO, was born. 17 The CJO was to implement general policies on allocation ofjoint tasks as approved by STANCIB. It was to be assisted by three groups: the Joint Intercept Control Group (JICG), the Joint Processing Allocation Group (JPAG) and the Joint Liaison Group (JLG). nA~TQbK VIA 'I'A15KN'I' ICKYII9bB 09111Hf'f eeri'fft8b B-YS'f8MB ifem"fbY 11 .+OP SECRET urRA
.IOP§EERE~ The CJO agreement owed its existence to the two most influential sponsors, Joseph Wenger (who commanded OP-20-G) and Preston Corderman (chief, ASA) for the Army, and it was in those days referred to as the "Corderman-Wenger Agreement." But when the first CJO was appointed, it turned out to be Colonel Harold G. Hayes, a long-time Army COMINTer and the new chiefofASA. The first task of the CJO was to allocate intercept tasks. This was not as easy as it appeared. Agreement was reached that counterpart targets were to be copied by the respective U.S. service cryptologic organization. All other targets, even those being intercepted entirely by a single service, were to be considered '1oint." The CJO then reallocated the intercept responsibilities. This had the largest potential impact on the resources of the Navy, which during World War II, as previously discussed, completely gave up '1oint" targets (with a few exceptions) to the Army. Intercept allocations really got down to priorities. With limited resources (and in 1946 resources were constrained), the key to obtaining copy was in the priority system. In September of that year USCICC decided to hold monthly meetings to consider priority problems. By this process a standing priority list, in rather general terms, was established. The CJO then made intercept assignments to positions in the field. When the CJO assigned ajoint case to a position it controlled (Le., one which had been turned over by one of the Service Cryptologic Agencies, as they were then called) there was no problem. But occasionally the CJO assigned a joint target to a service-protected position. This invariably met with resistance, and the CJO had no enforcement authority. The Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs), for their part, insured that counterpart positions were manned with the best operators, that they were never left uncovered, and that technical data were always up to date. In short, ifa target had to be slighted, it was likely to be the joint target. The servicemen never forgot whom they worked for. CJO also allocated processing tasks through the JPAG. Since people and equipment for processing were in very short supply, processing on each major target was to be done in only one place - either Arlington Hall or Nebraska Avenue - no matter which service collected the traffic. In those days communications systems were mutually exclusive rather than common and interlocking, and once traffic was intercepted by one service, it had to pass vertically through those communications channels all the way to Washington. This meant that there had to be communications between Nebraska Avenue and Arlington Hall so that the traffic could be exchanged, and under CJO a teleprinter link was set up. The services had a great deal of difficulty talking to each other (electrically, not to mention in person), and it was a real effort to establish common cryptographic gear for interoperability. In the late 1940s this process was just getting started. Communications security policy was, if possible, even more difficult to meld into a cohesive system than was COMINT. Through the war each service handled its own COMSEC matters with little reference to joint policy. In the Army, ASA was responsible for both . COMINT and COMSEC, a development substantially influenced by such technicians as Frank I1AP1BMlYllr 'flthIUi'l' IEFlYH8hB C8f¥HNT caNTRaL 8YMrJM8JatH'ft"i' 12
Page 2 and 3: NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
Page 4 and 5: 'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
Page 6 and 7: .§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
Page 8 and 9: 'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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Page 12 and 13: T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
Page 14 and 15: TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
Page 16 and 17: '(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
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Page 20 and 21: Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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Page 34 and 35: liaison office had maintained an of
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Page 40 and 41: ~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Page 44 and 45: Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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Page 50 and 51: George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
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Page 56 and 57: TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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Page 62 and 63: op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Page 68 and 69: TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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and he might have failed had he com
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Table 2
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Kim Philby strikes a smug pose duri
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cryptanalytic effort was gargantuan
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J.... .....,jl Printer seemed to be
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TOP SEcQriT liMBRA - (b) (1) (b)(3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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TOP SErBi; ~MB~ - suggested by the
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-- - I :(1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L
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Project. 54 Then, two years later,
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TRACKING SUBMARINES - THE STORY OF
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(1) Ib) (3)-50 USC 4 Ib) (3) -18 US
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.Jf'lb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 . .... ,."
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.' Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~~RA 65. NSN
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The American Navy Bombe ANavy WAVE
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The relationshi
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the IBM Selective Sequence Calculat
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The best general-purpose computer i
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HARVEST worked after a fashion and
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The message went via HF single side
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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~~ A bank ofKW·26s installed in NS
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Paper codes were archaic solutions
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The Early Years ofSecure Speech Voi
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But his memo did not actually estab
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AFSAM-7 Several different systems,
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 36. "NSA Review
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Chapter 6 Cryptology at Mid-decade
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the country, equipped with the fine
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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ecommended special decentralization
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The basic ground rule was that the
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was uninhabited, but was near a maj
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- _ .. - ------ It began with an in
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Fort Meade would be regarded as a P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Chapter 7 The Eisenhower Reforms TH
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The new NSCID m
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But this, said Baker, was not the w
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA a special study
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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In that year, NSAEUR, over the stre
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------- / (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 I
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 f9P SEeRE i ~BR
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--------------~~~~ concerns that NS
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competent authority...." Other comp
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Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Entirely apart from the well-known
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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