American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

lOP SECR!T"U~
been cadets at West Point. They both knew that the independence of AFSCC would have
to end, but with as little bloodshed as possible.
In order to enshrine the new era of good feelings, Samford initiated a novel experiment
in 1958, in which the chief of the Soviet Navy shop (GENS-2), a Navy captain, would
actually work for the director ofnaval security, while continuing to respond to DIRNSA on
operational matters. The next year he extended this unique arrangement to the Air Force
and Army, resubordinating the chiefs of GENS-1 and GENS-3 to their parent SCA
commanders. The idea was to give each SCA a stake in NSA, but it did not last long.
Seeing that it had failed to sublimate service factionalism (and even in some cases making
it worse), Frost scuttled the system in 1962. 57
Samford also moved quickly to resolve a long-standing dispute between Canine and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson. The 1956 McKinsey Study recommended
that NSA be run more on private business principles. To instill a sense of corporate
management, the director should appoint a civilian deputy from the business community.
But Canine, having called in the McKinsey group, rejected the recommendation. Instead,
he continued with his system ofelevating one ofhis service deputies to a position called the
vice-directorship, and he continued to act as his own de facto deputy. The dispute between
Canine, who opted strongly for military management, and Robertson, who demanded a
business approach, grew acrimonious and soured Canine's last months in office.
Samford found, on being elevated to the directorship, that Robertson already had
someone in mind. That someone was Joseph H. Ream, a top CBS executive. So, only some
two months into office, Samford named Ream to the new job of deputy director, just to give
the idea a whirl.
It soon whirled into oblivion. Ream had no SIGINT background, and the learning curve
was too steep. He had serious family problems that required extended trips to Florida and
that cut into his learning time. His lack of technical qualifications for the job simply could
not overcome his well-documented managerial skills. Further, he found it hard to deal
with an entrenched bureaucracy that viewed him as an outsider. Ream quit in frustration
only six months into the job. It was the last time anyone succcessfully imposed a
nongovernmentoutsider on NSA's top-level management structure. 58
In his place, Samford hired Howard Engstrom. Engstrom's impact on cryptology had
already been considerable. He was brought into the Navy from the Yale math department
during World War II. He quickly became influential in the development of computers for
cryptologic work, and when the war ended, he left the Navy to form Electronic Research
Associates (ERA), where he was the guiding genius in the effort to develop computers for
NSG, AFSA, and later NSA. In the mid-50s he left Remington Rand (which had
swallowed ERA), where he was a vice-president, to join NSA's R&D organization. When
he arrived at NSA, Samford elevated Engstrom to the position ofassociate director, which
gave him and his R&D organization special status and was designed to answer DoD-level
Ib\ItBf:::l!J VIA 'fAf:::l!JIt'f U'l!JYIISf:::l!J eSflIIN'f eSff'fftSf::: S'1'S'fl!JMSJ6II{Yf::: 1
~o:r Ri" Ii: A i A libil TQ FQRilI8!'f !'f/t'fISfhltf:::S
270