American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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cryptanalysts, Lieutenant R. B. Ely and Lieutenant Junior Grade Joseph Eachus, to
Bletchley to learn all they could about ENIGMA processing. In September the Navy began a
project to build a four-rotor ENIGMA processor (called a "bombe" by the British). When, in
the summer of 1943, the Navy moved to its new headquarters on Nebraska Avenue, a
major portion of the space was reserved for the bombes, which were being employed to
break the keys on German submarine ENIGMA traffic. In the end, the two nations drove the
U-boats from the North Atlantic, based in part on information provided by the bombe
project.
Meanwhile, the Army was having its own problems on the SIGINT front. Increasingly
suspicious of British reluctance to share cryptanalytic techniques, they retaliated by
refusing to share informationon voice ciphony equipment with Alan Turing. Since Turing
was one of the top Bletchley scientists (and has been given credit for developing the first
Britishbombe), this was a very serious breakdown in cooperation. It became the subject of
a long series ofexchanges between General George Marshall and Sir John Dill (chairman
ofthe British Joint Chiefs ofStaff), and at one point it seemed possible that the two sides
might break COMINT relations. The dispute was resolved in 1943 when the British agreed
to allow a total technical exchange. The agreement was hammered out during a series of
sessions between Military Intelligence Service and Commander Sir Edward Travis, who
headed GC&CS, during Travis's trip to Washington in May. The paper specified that the
United States would be responsible for the COMINT problem in the Far East, while the
British would worry about Europe. To implement this, it was agreed that the Americans
would send a team of cryptologists to Bletchley to work side by side with the British in all
aspects ofCOMINT, including cryptanalysis ofthe ENIGMA. That way the Americans would
gain technical expertise on the system without mounting a competing cryptanalytic effort
on the American side ofthe Atlantic.
To begin the new relationship, the Army sent a three-man team consisting of Colonel
Alfred McCormack, William Friedman, and Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor to
Bletchley. By mutual agreement, Taylor was left behind in London to serve as a liaison
officer and to act as a funnel for British COMINT being sent to the War Department in
Washington. Taylor's job was not easy, as there was a good deal of second-guessing the
British forthrightness in the exchange. But as the war progressed it became smoother and
eventually became a very open exchange ofhighly sensitive information.
With the Axis almost defeated, the thoughts of cryptologists in 1945 turned with
increasing frequency to the Soviet Union. Both nations had maintained rudimentary
efforts against the "Communist menace" since the 1920s, and they both kept small efforts
even during the war. In June of 1945 ANCIB proposed to the British that they extend
their wartime cooperation to the intercept and exploitation of their erstwhile but
distrusted ally. They called the project BOURBON, and it was kept compartmented for the
obvious reason that the Soviets were still officially on our side. The arrangement was
largely informal and involved the exchange ofliaison units on both sides ofthe Atlantic.
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