American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (1) Special Committee on Compromising Emanations (SCOCE) - TEMPEST. NSA acted as its secretariat and effectively did all the work. 5 l\ Far more than just prescribing COMSECpoIicies, NSA became deeply involved in the design and production process. The Agency\generated keying material using a wide variety of techniques. NSA also designed CQMSEC machines and simply turned the production process over to a conttactor after \atl the designs were completed. The contractor in those days was little mOre than\an assembly organization. All the interesting work was done in-house. 57 This would change in the 1980s under Walter Deeley's "New Way of Doing Business."58 AFSAM-7 In the early 1950s AFSA, and later NSA, pushed ahea~ \\ Ito develop their first central, multiservice encryption device, the AFSAM-7, later the KL-7. Although the Army wanted all~otor and the Nav onlyal Irotor, Canine decreed uniformity, and NSA~e Army' . otor as the standard. The KL 7 proved immensely popular, and some 20,000 were pro uced at the very reasonable cost of $1,200 a piece. Weighing only thirty pounds, it could run off either AC or DC power (including ajeep battery). The Navy strongly resisted the AFElAM-7/KL-7 development. Mter rejecting several modifications designed to satisfy their requirements, they adopted a modified device called a KL-47. The KL-47 was to h I n T n d sin it extensively aboard shi . When the AFSAM-7 was still new, the JCS proposed giving it to NATO countries. This got NSA into a very murky area. Defense and State had for years been concerned about the security ofD.S. defense information on NATO communications. (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 I1AnBLtJ VIA 'fALEl~ffIfElYIISLtJ eSftIH,'f eSn'fftSL t¥iS'ftl'MS dSm'fLY NOT REI,EASABJ Ii: 1'9 F'8REI614'NAilONALS 217
AFSAM-7 Several different systems, including Typex and M-209, were loaned for NATO use, but none of them solved the problem of availability and security. Then in\ 1953 the JCS proposed the brand-new AFSAM-7, the best off-line system the ms. had.\State and CIA both opposed the decision, but after several years of acrimonious\disagreement, USCIB approved the AFSAM-7 for transfer to NATO. NSA voted with themajority~ 1 1 59 -- The Push for On-line Encipherment The conversion of record communications to on-line encipherment was probably the most significant COMSEC development of the postwar era. In the space of a few years NSA led the U.S. government into the era ofsecure circuitry. HAI'T9bK VIA TAbKI'TT KKYUSbFJ e8MHff e8U'i'R8b SYS'i'FlMS d8m'i'bY NOT RELEASARJ E TO EOT;UiaQl'r NNi'18NALS 218
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NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
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'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
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.§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
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'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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fepSEeRET~ Non - Responsive IOP3EeR
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T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
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TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
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'(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
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--------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
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Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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TOP5iCRET~ exacted revenge over a p
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lap 5fEftf'f ~BRA order to tighten
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1'011 S!CRET~ Government offices on
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Te"S!CREI~ were to continue to trai
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:rep 'I!!!CRE I U~RA Rowlett and Wi
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:rep Sl!eREru~ cryptanalysts, Lieut
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liaison office had maintained an of
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ..tOP §EERI!T~
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~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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lOP 5I!CREfij~RA Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
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fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
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OPSECREi tJM8itA to sink or swim on
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TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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T9P SECRET liMBIbIc When the ROK ar
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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lap SECRET l:JMBRA In early 1952 mu
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TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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lOP SIiEAET l::JMBRA Ib) (3) -P.L.
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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and he might have failed had he com
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Table 2
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Page 199 and 200: Project. 54 Then, two years later,
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Page 221 and 222: Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Page 229: But his memo did not actually estab
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Page 241 and 242: the country, equipped with the fine
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 f9P SEeRE i ~BR
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--------------~~~~ concerns that NS
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competent authority...." Other comp
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Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Entirely apart from the well-known
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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