American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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employed an electronically generated key that was compared with the German cipher text. Although it did not have a true internally stored program, the settings were operatoradjustable according to how close he or she thought they were to a cryptanalytic solution. They called it Colossus. Some contend that it was the world's first true computer, although Colossus must compete for that honor with ENIAC, which was being developed at the University of Pennsylvania's Moore School of Electronics to generate complex artillery ballistics tables for the Army. Either Colossus, designed for cryptologic use, or ENIAC, for ballistics, probably deserves the title ofthe world's first computer. 3 Postwar Developments OP-20-G could see the technological possibilities in the bombe, and it was decided even before the war ended that the effort should continue. But National Cash Register had no intention ofcontinuing the association. They wanted to return to making cash registers. So at the end of the war, NCML was physically evicted, along with the remainder of its undelivered bombes, and the project came to a halt.' Howard Engstrom OP-20-G needed a prime contractor with which to work. Months before the war ended, Howard Engstrom, a key figure on the bombe project, decided to start a new company specifically to do business with OP-20 G. At war's end, he left the Navy and took with him the best and brightest technicians at NCML. They set up a new company called Electronic Research Associates (ERA), under the wing of an already established firm called Northwestern Aeronautical Corporation in St. Paul, Minnesota. The Navy made no specific promises regarding contracts for the fledgling company, but none were needed. Engstrom and associates had a corner on the technological expertise that OP 20-G required, and contracts flowed almost immediately.s 1I1d'Bbl!l 'iIA 'fAbI!Jli'f IlI!JYIIebI!J eeMIN'f eeN'ffteb SYS'fI!Jf9IS deIN'fbY NOT REI E AS ABI F 'to i'QRI!JI8H n-A:'f16f4'ALS 197
Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The relationship between ERA and the Navy was emblematic ofthe way relationships had developed between the cryptologists and private industry. During the war OP-20-G had developed a close relationship with IBM, Eastman Kodak, and National Cash Register. SIS had a similar kind of relationship with Bell Laboratories and Teletype Corporation. Those businesses kept a stable of cleared people who could do jobs quickly and quietly for the cryptologists. In the COMINT and COMSEC businesses, it did not pay to advertise. 6 Both the bombe and ENIAC had been developed through classified wartime military contracts. Thus computing in the United States began in the rarified atmosphere of tight security. Though the cryptanalytic aspects were not publicized, the Army relationship with the Moore School became a matter ofpublic knowledge in 1946 when the inventors of ENIAC, John Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert, gave a series of lectures on electronic computers. As the two men left the Moore School to establish a computer manufacturing company, they dispersed their knowledge nationwide in what became known as the Moore School Lectures. Many felt that this lecture series launched the computer industry in the United States. 7 Howard Engstrom had found out about the Moore School/Lectures, and he suggested that the Navy send a cryptologist to observe. Thus, when theilectures began, sitting in the back of the room was Lieutenant Commander James T. Pendergrass, a Navy mathematician employed at Nebraska Avenue. Pendergrass delivered a report to the Navy on the Moore lectures which focused attention on the emerging new computer technology. This resulted in negotiations with ERA whiCh led to the construction of the Atlas machine. 8 Like the bombe before it, the first generation of postwar cryptologic computers produced highly specialized machines, called in those days "rapid analytic machines" (RAMs). Each machine was constructed for a different purpose and attacked a different cryptanalytic machine or problem. Programs were /particular rather than general, and inputs and outputs were of specialized design. A listof AFSA machines, both present and projected, in 1952 contained sixty RAMs, as opposed to only eight that had more flexible objectives. 9 An example ofa RAM wa~ rhich was developed by ERA to attack I to Even in those early days computer companies were willing to take on difficult developmental tasks. For instance, ()perating under a 1947 contract, ERA developed the world's first magnetic drum storage system~spart ofa RAM project called GOLDBERG. ll A successor project, called ATLAS (also built by ERA), (ipplied the drum storage technology to a more general purpose cryptanalytic processor. ATL.A.Sw(iS ERA's first major computer development, and it led to the company's first commercialprQduct, the ERA 1101, produced after the company had become merged with Remington-Rand~Univacto form the first major American computer company.12 Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 IIANBhe VIA 'Hl:heN'f lEe {fI6he e6MHf'f e6H'fft6h S?S'feMS66Hf'fL? NOT REI E A i A Qbg ~9 F9RI"JI6N lifATIONALS 198
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NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
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'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
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.§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
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'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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fepSEeRET~ Non - Responsive IOP3EeR
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T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
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TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
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'(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
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--------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
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Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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TOP5iCRET~ exacted revenge over a p
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lap 5fEftf'f ~BRA order to tighten
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1'011 S!CRET~ Government offices on
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Te"S!CREI~ were to continue to trai
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:rep 'I!!!CRE I U~RA Rowlett and Wi
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:rep Sl!eREru~ cryptanalysts, Lieut
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liaison office had maintained an of
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ..tOP §EERI!T~
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~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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lOP 5I!CREfij~RA Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
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fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
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OPSECREi tJM8itA to sink or swim on
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TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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T9P SECRET liMBIbIc When the ROK ar
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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lap SECRET l:JMBRA In early 1952 mu
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TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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lOP SIiEAET l::JMBRA Ib) (3) -P.L.
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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and he might have failed had he com
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Table 2
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
Page 160 and 161: RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Page 166 and 167: Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
Page 168 and 169: Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
Page 170 and 171: Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Page 176 and 177: -TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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Page 188 and 189: Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Page 196: -- - I :(1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L
Page 199 and 200: Project. 54 Then, two years later,
Page 201 and 202: TRACKING SUBMARINES - THE STORY OF
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Page 205 and 206: .Jf'lb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 . .... ,."
Page 207 and 208: .' Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~~RA 65. NSN
Page 209: The American Navy Bombe ANavy WAVE
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Page 221 and 222: Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
Page 223 and 224: ~~ A bank ofKW·26s installed in NS
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Page 227 and 228: The Early Years ofSecure Speech Voi
Page 229 and 230: But his memo did not actually estab
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Page 235 and 236: Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
Page 237 and 238: Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 36. "NSA Review
Page 239 and 240: Chapter 6 Cryptology at Mid-decade
Page 241 and 242: the country, equipped with the fine
Page 253 and 254: ecommended special decentralization
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Fort Meade would be regarded as a P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Chapter 7 The Eisenhower Reforms TH
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The new NSCID m
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But this, said Baker, was not the w
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA a special study
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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In that year, NSAEUR, over the stre
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------- / (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 I
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 f9P SEeRE i ~BR
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--------------~~~~ concerns that NS
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competent authority...." Other comp
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Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Entirely apart from the well-known
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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