American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

Ib) (1)
Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36
Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
Ib) (3) -18 USC 798
group finally concluded that only Tyura Tam and possibly one to three other operational
launchers existed, including Verkhnyaya Salda andYur'ya. Plesetsk was still assessed as
unfinished.I
I
The paranoia of the 1950s receded. to be replaced by the optimism and military force
projection policies ofthe 1960s. By the time Kennedy became president, Dulles had proved
that the Soviets still presented/no real strategic nuclear threat, although clearly that
threat was on the horizon. During the dark days ofthe 1950s, though, when no one really
knew what went on behindthe Iron Curtainf
lIt was President Eisenli-ow=e~r~'s"'Th~o"'Tl-e-c"':"'a-rd"'.--------""""---
I
The Chinese Threat
Compared with the Soviet Union, China could hardly be considered a strategic threat.
But Stalin and Mao appeared to be on friendly terms. China had intervened in Korea, and
many Americans (including some in the intelligence business) believed in an overarehing
Communist conspiracy - the Sino-Soviet Bloc. If Stalin had the bomb, could Mao be far
behind?
American suspicions of a close Sino-Soviet relationship were confirmed through
COMINT by the exploitation ofCOMINTERN communications. This traffic showed a longstanding
liaison between the COMINTERN and Mao's forces, going back to the 1930s.
When, in the late 1940s, ASA first began exploiting Soviet plain-language printer,
analysts discovered that the Soviets were sending World War II lend-lease equipment to
Mao, who was then attempting to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Clearly, the USSR was the
major arms supplier for the Chinese armies, and the Soviets had nuclear weapons. S8
During the 1954 Quemoy and Matsu crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
pledged American arms in defense of Formosa. The pledge was repeated during the 1958
renewal of the offshore islands imbroglio, but Dulles persuaded Chiang to renounce the
use offorce against the PRC, and the islands never again caused a confrontation between
the U.S. and China. 39 Meanwhile, however, U.S. intelligence poured ever-increasing
resources into the China problem.
In manv wavs China resembled the USSR I
resources to go against the second-most-serious threat were scarce. I
IThe Chinese program was delayed for several years by the Sino-
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