American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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Just\V~atwa~ lanyway? Jammers actually produced noncommunications
signals, and the Army contended that they were ELINT, not COMINT. The entire subject of
ELI1'fI'\V8:S itlCl1a()S atthe time, andI ~imply contributed to the disorder. The
services also saw electronic warfare applications, and they wanted their own people in the
projectedNSA~controlle~
~ites to send EW-related information to their parent
services. NSA feared this approach because it would spread COMINT-related information
outside codeword channels, and the services might turn the information into EW
(electronic warfare) projects that would block COMINT hearability. This prompted NSA to
appoint a committee to study the matter of jamming versus COMINT requirements. The
confusiohin definitions foreshadowed more serious divisions during the Vietnam era.
directinvasion ofNSA's turf.
his was a
Inthe mid-1950s, a~
~ontinuedalo~gan inconclusive course, various
schemes emerged for the eventual institutionalization o~ I Most had as their
central assumption that CIA would not continue in charge, and some placed NSA in
control. The services wanted the mission but did not want to budget for it. One proposed
plan would even have given the mission to the Federal Communications Commission. In
late 1955, the secretary ofdefense put the matter to rest by decreeing that it was an ELINT
mission and made the Air Force executive agent. The Air Force had only recently become
executive agent for ELINT, and it had a central ELINT processing center. Since no resources
were allocated to d~ \\ Iit became subsumed in the overall service ELINT mission.
So in the end a separate monitoring system was not built. The jamming mission was
handled as a corollary mission by the three SCAs, and when, in 1958, control ofELINT went
to NSA, the threat posed b~ lvanished.91
HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT
YSTEMS JOINTLY
NOT RELEA
OREIGN NATIONALS
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