American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

equired considerable planning, and they left a defection note in a safe deposit box in a
Laurel bank, to which they referred during the Radio Moscow broadcast. So the whole
idea had been evidently a long time abuilding. 87
The defection precipitated a storm of criticism of NSA. The secretary of defense
initiated an investigation of NSA security practices. Not to be outdone, the House Un­
American Activities Committee, chaired by Representative Francis E. Walter of
Pennsylvania, launched its own investigation. Finally, President Eisenhower directed
that the FBI initiate an investigation to determine if there were any more potential
Martins and Mitchells in the ranks at NSA.88
All three investigations lambasted the current practice at NSA of granting interim
security clearances upon successful completion of the polygraph. Canine had authorized
this procedure as an emergency measure during the Korean War, and it had come into
routine use. After Martin and Mitchell the practice was terminated, and every employee
had to have a complete background check in addition to the polygraph before performing
any sort ofclassified work at NSA. 89
The Walter Committee investigation was exhaustive. It spanned thirteen months,
took two thousand man-hours, covered flfteen states, and resulted in sixteen separate
hearings. Thirty-four present or former NSA employees testified in closed session. NSA
and the Department of Defense began by opposing committee access to NSA records, but
eventually a compromise was worked out, and NSA and the committee finished on
reasonably good terms. Still, the Agency could not keep the process from being
sensationalized, and it was stung by a charge by Walter that NSA was a "nest of sexual
deviates."9o
The legislative result of the Martin and Mitchell affair was a law which set up the
legislative authority for NSA's security system. Among other things, it established that
employment at NSA was appropriate only when it was "clearly consistent with the
national security." It required a fun field investigation prior to employment (Le., no
interim clearances) and gave the secretary of defense additional authority to fire NSA
employees "when such action is deemed necessary in the interest of the United
States... .'>91
In addition, the committee made certain recommendations concerning NSA's
administrative practices - for instance, making professional psychological and psychiatric
services available in assessing applicants and employees who revealed instability. But
almost an the committee's recommendations had already been implemented, and in its
final report the committee gave NSA credit for this. The most far-reaching ofthe changes
related to the termination ofthe procedure ofgranting routine interim clearances, and the
institution of the so-called three-hour rule, which required that employees three hours
overdue for work would be reported to the security office. These and a long list of other
changes became a permanent part ofNSA's way ofdoing business. 92
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