American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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George A. Brownell The Brownell Committee held fourteen days offormal sessions, which were backed by many days of research and data-gathering. Its report was a scathing indictment of old ways ofdoing business. Its bottom line stated bluntly that The added difficulty ofthe problem under attack places ....._----------_... a greater premium than ever on the quantity and quality of the physical and intellectual resources available, and on the efficiency and clarity ofthe organization charged with the task. While much has recently been done to provide adequate physical resources for the job, the Committee is convinced that the present organization of our COMINT activities seriously impedes the efficiency of the operation, and prevents us from attracting and retaining as much top quality scientific management manpower as this country ought to be investing in so important a field. It is highly significant to the Committee that the return of many of the best wartime COMINT brains to more attractive llAf(Bh~VIA 'fA~N:'I' l
The committee concluded that the creation of AFSA, coinciding as it had with the creation ofUSAFSS, had resulted in four COMINT agencies where there had formerly been two. Itcriticized AFSAC for obstructionism and requested that it be abolished. It attacked USAFSS as a virtually autonomous organization not operating underjoint control at all. The positive recommendations of the Brownell Committee are worth studying, because they encompass the present-day structure of SIGINT in the United States. AFSA should be greatly strengthened, especially in its ability to control tasking at SCA collection sites. AFSA or its successor should be removed from JCS control and should be placed under USCIB, whose membership should be revised, and whose procedures should be governed by a vote of four, rather than unanimity, as had been the case with AFSAC. AFSA should centralize and consolidate processing operations wherever possible to increase the resources brought to bear on intractable cryptanalytic problems. The director should be upgraded to three-star rank, and should be appointed by the president to a fouryear term. He should have a civilian deputy. Civilian career development should be encouraged to a much greater extent than formerly. The next several months were spent putting the Brownell report into directive language. The result was the Truman Memorandum, issued on 24 October 1952. This memo directed a complete restructuring of COMINT along the lines that Brownell recommended. It resolved an on-going dispute about how to change AFSA by abolishing it and creating in its place a new organization called NSA. Its director would work for the secretary of defense, who would become the "executive agent" for COMINT for the entire government. On the same date the National Security Council issued a revised NSCID 9, almost a verbatim quote of the Truman Memorandum. Both documents were classified Top Secret, thus hiding the official creation of NSA from the American public for many years. All that remained was for the secretary of defense to issue a memorandum establishing the new agency. He did so on 4 November the day that Dwight Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson for the presidency. The creation of NSA was one of the last historical legacies oftwenty years ofDemocratic governance. The Truman Memorandum, on the advice ofLieutenant General Canine, had excluded COMSEC. Despite his belief that NSA should have both a COMINT and a COMSEC role, Canine recommended against mixing both in the same document. Lovett's memorandum on 4 November did mention that NSA would inherit the COMSEC functions formerly performed by AFSA. A memo in December spelled out those functions in more detail, and this marked NSA's first formal COMSEC charter. 17 il.A :-TQbi: VIA TAUJtfT KKYII8bK 68MIU'f 68N'fR8b SYS'fBMS d8lfffbY NOT REI F A ~ Aibi: TQ P8RrJI8N NA:TIOH'1"L5 35
Page 2 and 3: NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
Page 4 and 5: 'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
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Page 8 and 9: 'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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Page 12 and 13: T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
Page 14 and 15: TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
Page 16 and 17: '(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
Page 18 and 19: --------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
Page 20 and 21: Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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Page 40 and 41: ~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Page 44 and 45: Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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Page 52 and 53: fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
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Page 78 and 79: and he might have failed had he com
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Page 82 and 83: --------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Kim Philby strikes a smug pose duri
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cryptanalytic effort was gargantuan
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J.... .....,jl Printer seemed to be
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TOP SEcQriT liMBRA - (b) (1) (b)(3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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TOP SErBi; ~MB~ - suggested by the
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-- - I :(1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L
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Project. 54 Then, two years later,
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TRACKING SUBMARINES - THE STORY OF
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(1) Ib) (3)-50 USC 4 Ib) (3) -18 US
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.Jf'lb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 . .... ,."
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.' Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~~RA 65. NSN
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The American Navy Bombe ANavy WAVE
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The relationshi
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the IBM Selective Sequence Calculat
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The best general-purpose computer i
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HARVEST worked after a fashion and
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The message went via HF single side
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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~~ A bank ofKW·26s installed in NS
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Paper codes were archaic solutions
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The Early Years ofSecure Speech Voi
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But his memo did not actually estab
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AFSAM-7 Several different systems,
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 36. "NSA Review
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Chapter 6 Cryptology at Mid-decade
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the country, equipped with the fine
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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ecommended special decentralization
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The basic ground rule was that the
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was uninhabited, but was near a maj
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- _ .. - ------ It began with an in
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Fort Meade would be regarded as a P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Chapter 7 The Eisenhower Reforms TH
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The new NSCID m
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But this, said Baker, was not the w
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA a special study
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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In that year, NSAEUR, over the stre
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 f9P SEeRE i ~BR
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--------------~~~~ concerns that NS
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competent authority...." Other comp
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Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Entirely apart from the well-known
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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