American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 Official Use Only, or FOUO), was reserved primarily for information relating to military hardware. 71 Their British allies had three classifications. Above Secret they added the term Most Secret. In 1944 the Army adopted the British three-tiered system, but called the highest category "Top" Secret. COMINT, being among the most sensitive items on the menu, was classified Top Secret.72 When the Army obtained an agreement with accs in 1943, the Americans had to agree to attach a security caveat associated with COMINT. The most sensitive information (which at the time included ENIGMA and MAGIC decrypts) was now handled under a special codeword called ULTRA. Information derived from traffic analysis, DF,and plain text received codeword protection, but different codewords were used to denote lesser sensitivity - THUMB and PEARL were two which appeared during World War II. Mter the war the system devolved into two codeword categories: Top Secret Codeword, and everything else. That which related to COMINT but was not derived directly from communications intercepts began to receive the stamp Handle Via COM!NT Channels Only (HVCCO). Within cryptology, there were certain projects that received much more limited distributions. BOURBON, the early Soviet problem, was a good example, and VENONA got even more limited handling still. This system ofad hoc compartmentations continued into the early 1960s, when it was augmented by a more formal compartmentation system which was applied to SIGINT product reports. The most sensitive category was Gamma, A lesser category, called Delta, was often used to protect "-----------------' Despite the strict secrecy applied to the trade, the number of people indoctrinated for COMINT rose steadily as its utility came to be recognized. By 1955 the number of COMINT clearances within the federal government (and to contractors) had grown to over 31,000, and the Hoover Commission expressed concern about the spread of highly sensitive information to such a large group. Ofthe~~ I This was a far cry from the six people that Friedman hired to carryon the Army's COMINT business in 1929 or the two people (Laurance Safford and Agnes Driscoll) who began Navy COMINT in the 1920s. 73 Pulling on theother end of the rope were the people who advocated an even broader disseminatioI).of COMINT. In 1960 Lyman Kirkpatrick (who headed the Kirkpatrick Committee- see p. 263) took the Defense Department to task for over-strict rules regarding intelligence. (And by intelligence, he was clearly referring to COMINT.) Kirkpatrick wrote: (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 llA:NBLI!l VIA: 'fA:U:lff KI!lYH6LI!l e6MHff e6lffIt6L 8YMI!lM8J6Uf'fLY NOTRE} EASAW i'l'QlilQRBI8HHA:'l'IONALS 276
Entirely apart from the well-known tendency throughout the intelligence community to overclassify, the special handling required for a very significant portion of intelligence information has at times deprived key personnel of information vital to the successful discharge of their responsibilities. 74 The tug ofwar between the advocates of secrecy and dissemination was never-ending. Nor could the conflict be resolved. As SIGINT became more successful, it became an inevitable victim of its own success. Utility meant dissemination, and dissemination meant risk. BREACHES IN THE DIKE - THE SECURITY CASES The first significant breaches of the security system came from within rather than from without. The first two were quiet, and while they both involved significant compromise, their very obscurity minimized the damage. Neither became a cause celebre, although one of them became public. The third, however, did major damage primarily because it became a public case. L' Affaire Weisband The first case did the most real damage. But it was so successfully hushed that only a few insiders knew that it had occurred. It involved an AFSA analyst named William Weisband. Weisband was an immigrant. Born in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1908, he had entered the United States in either 1925 or 1929. (The record on this point is obscure.) He became a citizen in 1938 and, while living in New York City, was inducted into the Army. Weisband went into the Signal Corps, and he first began working with ASA in 1943, where he became a favorite ofColonel Harold Hayes (who headed the Army's cryptologic activities in the Mediterranean). As an accomplished linguist, he was an ASA natural and received a transfer from North Africa to Arlington Hall in 1944. The end ofthe war found him still working there, and he hired on as a civilian. ASA needed all the help it could get in 1945, and getting a linguist like Weisband was a good day's work. 75 Unfortunately for ASA, Weisband was a Communist and suspected ofbeing a spy. He had handled other agents passing defense information to the Soviets even before he entered the Army. He apparently gave up handling agents once he entered the service, but after he arrived at Arlington Hall he probably resumed his old avocation. IIANQJ"OS 'f!./r Wd:kl?l'f !ESYII8bEl S8r,nU'f S8U'fR8b SYM'ElMSd8m'fbY NOT BELE 4 SU3Tsi: '1'9 P8Rl3f6I( NAIIONALS 277
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NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
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'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
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.§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
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'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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fepSEeRET~ Non - Responsive IOP3EeR
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T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
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TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
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'(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 TOP SECAr, tJM
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--------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
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Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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TOP5iCRET~ exacted revenge over a p
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lap 5fEftf'f ~BRA order to tighten
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1'011 S!CRET~ Government offices on
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Te"S!CREI~ were to continue to trai
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:rep 'I!!!CRE I U~RA Rowlett and Wi
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:rep Sl!eREru~ cryptanalysts, Lieut
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liaison office had maintained an of
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ..tOP §EERI!T~
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~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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lOP 5I!CREfij~RA Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
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fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
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OPSECREi tJM8itA to sink or swim on
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TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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T9P SECRET liMBIbIc When the ROK ar
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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lap SECRET l:JMBRA In early 1952 mu
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TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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lOP SIiEAET l::JMBRA Ib) (3) -P.L.
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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and he might have failed had he com
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Table 2
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Kim Philby strikes a smug pose duri
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cryptanalytic effort was gargantuan
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J.... .....,jl Printer seemed to be
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TOP SEcQriT liMBRA - (b) (1) (b)(3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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TOP SErBi; ~MB~ - suggested by the
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-- - I :(1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L
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Project. 54 Then, two years later,
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TRACKING SUBMARINES - THE STORY OF
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(1) Ib) (3)-50 USC 4 Ib) (3) -18 US
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.Jf'lb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 . .... ,."
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.' Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~~RA 65. NSN
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The American Navy Bombe ANavy WAVE
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The relationshi
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the IBM Selective Sequence Calculat
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The best general-purpose computer i
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HARVEST worked after a fashion and
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The message went via HF single side
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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~~ A bank ofKW·26s installed in NS
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Paper codes were archaic solutions
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The Early Years ofSecure Speech Voi
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But his memo did not actually estab
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AFSAM-7 Several different systems,
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
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Page 241 and 242: the country, equipped with the fine
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Page 253 and 254: ecommended special decentralization
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Page 287: Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Page 293 and 294: Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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Page 297 and 298: Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
Page 299 and 300: 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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