American Cryptology during the Cold War - The Black Vault

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:rep Sl!eREru~ cryptanalysts, Lieutenant R. B. Ely and Lieutenant Junior Grade Joseph Eachus, to Bletchley to learn all they could about ENIGMA processing. In September the Navy began a project to build a four-rotor ENIGMA processor (called a "bombe" by the British). When, in the summer of 1943, the Navy moved to its new headquarters on Nebraska Avenue, a major portion of the space was reserved for the bombes, which were being employed to break the keys on German submarine ENIGMA traffic. In the end, the two nations drove the U-boats from the North Atlantic, based in part on information provided by the bombe project. Meanwhile, the Army was having its own problems on the SIGINT front. Increasingly suspicious of British reluctance to share cryptanalytic techniques, they retaliated by refusing to share informationon voice ciphony equipment with Alan Turing. Since Turing was one of the top Bletchley scientists (and has been given credit for developing the first Britishbombe), this was a very serious breakdown in cooperation. It became the subject of a long series ofexchanges between General George Marshall and Sir John Dill (chairman ofthe British Joint Chiefs ofStaff), and at one point it seemed possible that the two sides might break COMINT relations. The dispute was resolved in 1943 when the British agreed to allow a total technical exchange. The agreement was hammered out during a series of sessions between Military Intelligence Service and Commander Sir Edward Travis, who headed GC&CS, during Travis's trip to Washington in May. The paper specified that the United States would be responsible for the COMINT problem in the Far East, while the British would worry about Europe. To implement this, it was agreed that the Americans would send a team of cryptologists to Bletchley to work side by side with the British in all aspects ofCOMINT, including cryptanalysis ofthe ENIGMA. That way the Americans would gain technical expertise on the system without mounting a competing cryptanalytic effort on the American side ofthe Atlantic. To begin the new relationship, the Army sent a three-man team consisting of Colonel Alfred McCormack, William Friedman, and Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor to Bletchley. By mutual agreement, Taylor was left behind in London to serve as a liaison officer and to act as a funnel for British COMINT being sent to the War Department in Washington. Taylor's job was not easy, as there was a good deal of second-guessing the British forthrightness in the exchange. But as the war progressed it became smoother and eventually became a very open exchange ofhighly sensitive information. With the Axis almost defeated, the thoughts of cryptologists in 1945 turned with increasing frequency to the Soviet Union. Both nations had maintained rudimentary efforts against the "Communist menace" since the 1920s, and they both kept small efforts even during the war. In June of 1945 ANCIB proposed to the British that they extend their wartime cooperation to the intercept and exploitation of their erstwhile but distrusted ally. They called the project BOURBON, and it was kept compartmented for the obvious reason that the Soviets were still officially on our side. The arrangement was largely informal and involved the exchange ofliaison units on both sides ofthe Atlantic. nA~fBY!lVIA 'fll:hB~f'fKBYII8hB 08MUf'f 08U'fR8b 8¥S'fi!JMS d6IH'i'bY 1'1O?' PIi:J,,1i: A i A RYJ TQ FQREll8n n1r'i'16Ib\L~ 15
Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Tap.seeRI!T u~ But in September, with the war officially over, the U.S. had a legal problem. Could it now continue to collaborate with its British allies?\.Clearly, the American cryptologists, good as they had become, still regarded GC&CS with a certain awe. In many cryptanalytic areas the British were still ahead of us, and their organization of the COMINT system was superb. And of course there was the problem of the Soviet Union. Already the wartime alliance had disintegrated. In September of 1945 both the Army and Navy suggested to President Truman that collaboration with the British continue for the present "in view of the disturbed conditions ofthe world and the necessity ofke.eping informed of the technical developments and possible hostile intentions of foreign nations...." In reply, Truman signed a brief, single-sentence note sent to him by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff: The Secretary ofWar and the Secretary ofthe Navy are hereby author.iz.ed to direct the Chiefof Staff, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of NavalOperations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify, or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests ofthe United States. 20 Now that the American side was officially unleashed to collaborate with the British, it seemed necessary to write a bilateral agreement for the postwar year$.\ After months of meetings and conferences, the two sides sat down in March 1946 to sign the British-U.S., or BRUSA, Agreement. The paper which charted the future course of both countries was only four pages long. (The policy conference at which it was signed wa.sfollowed by a technical conference which wrote all the fine print appearing later as annexes and appendices.) I With the signing of the BRUSA Agreement, the BOURBON liaison offices on both sides of the Atlantic became representatives of STANCIB and LSIB, T e BOURBON 0 lcer, '":C;::;-"om-m-an-d'e-r--;::Gi""r-a-n":"'t'M·a-n-s-o-n-,-w-a-s-I... ·n-v-e-s":"'te-'--w"'lt'l"r"'l"'It~e--ra-t'l"r"e-r-c-u-m""T"-er...Jsome title ofU. S. Liaison Officer, London SIGINT Centre (LSIC, as GC&CS was then known) - or USLO LSIC. He reported to STANCIB through the deputy coordinator for Liaison, part of the new CJO structure. In early 1946 the British moved LSIC from its wartime location at Bletchley to Eastcote, outside London, and began using a new title, Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. Space for Manson was provided at Eastcote. The BOURBON I11d~BLI!i VI1\: 'f1\Lrln'f ItrlYIISb8 eSMIN'f eSn'fftSbS-YS'f8MS dSIN'fbY ~TS'i RKbK &.SARbK 'is li'SRd!JIQN ~Tlt'fI8Nlth8 TOP SECRET~A 16
Page 2 and 3: NO. 90,3 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC
Page 4 and 5: 'fOP !!(:FU!T tlM81b\ UNITED STATES
Page 6 and 7: .§ Ib) (1) .~; Ib) (3) -50 USC 403
Page 8 and 9: 'fap SECRIiTjJ.MB'1t4 The Reorganiz
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Page 12 and 13: T6'5ECRET~ Non - Responsive iii A ;
Page 14 and 15: TOPSEeRE~ American History, 1775-19
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Page 18 and 19: --------------~ - - - -- - - TOp Si
Page 20 and 21: Tap SECRET~RA One other wartime acc
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Page 24 and 25: lap 5fEftf'f ~BRA order to tighten
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Page 34 and 35: liaison office had maintained an of
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Page 40 and 41: ~PSEeREr~ Rear Admiral Earl E. Ston
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Page 44 and 45: Analytic section, Arlington Hall St
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Page 50 and 51: George A. Brownell The Brownell Com
Page 52 and 53: fe, 5EEREf UMBRA KOREA Ithas become
Page 54 and 55: OPSECREi tJM8itA to sink or swim on
Page 56 and 57: TOP SECRET liMBItA dramatic switch
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Page 62 and 63: op SECRET l::JMBRA However, encount
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Page 68 and 69: TOP SECRETtJMBItA The AFSA Factor O
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Page 78 and 79: and he might have failed had he com
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--------------- - -- In 1953 a comm
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Canine continued to strengthen the
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~RA Arlington Hall and Nebraska Ave
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itselfwas established concluded tha
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hammered out an agreement which res
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Canine thought that Navy COMINTwas
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ofhis term as DIRNSA, it was rumore
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leap SECRET tJMBkA system, oversigh
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA lOP SECRET '='M
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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(3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18 USC 798 Ii:!"
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-------- ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3)-18
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-------- (b) (1) (b) (3) OGA (1) (3
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,Ib) (1) !Ib) (3) !OGA ,I' L t6~i~~
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA Just\V~atwa~ la
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Dulles was interested in HUMINT and
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the theater and on to the United St
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ibl(3)-
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\ \ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 8
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L. 86-36
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\ ~ ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86
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------- ----j
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------- /
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OGA ( 1) ( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P
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- -------- ~-
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-------- (1) Ib) (3)
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( 1) (3)-50 USC 403 3) -P.L. 86-36
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ASA PAC in the 1940s ASA's first p(
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~U~RA rather than to support tactic
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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The Navy site on AdakIsland in the
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All services showed an interest in
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intelligence collection. The best k
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 (3) -P.
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RC·130 Then disaster struck. On 2
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Dulles protested the SOviet attitud
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During the Oval Office review ofthe
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 34. Hoover Comm
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 81. David Kahn,
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Hb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 119. ~A Chronol
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Truman administration also saw the
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(b) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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-TOP SECRET tJMBRA A second outside
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The next lead was a 1948 translatio
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Kim Philby strikes a smug pose duri
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cryptanalytic effort was gargantuan
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J.... .....,jl Printer seemed to be
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TOP SEcQriT liMBRA - (b) (1) (b)(3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) 3)-
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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TOP SErBi; ~MB~ - suggested by the
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-- - I :(1) (3)-50 USC 403 (3) -P.L
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Project. 54 Then, two years later,
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TRACKING SUBMARINES - THE STORY OF
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(1) Ib) (3)-50 USC 4 Ib) (3) -18 US
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.Jf'lb) (3) -P.L. 86-36 . .... ,."
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.' Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~~RA 65. NSN
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The American Navy Bombe ANavy WAVE
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The relationshi
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the IBM Selective Sequence Calculat
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The best general-purpose computer i
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HARVEST worked after a fashion and
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The message went via HF single side
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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~~ A bank ofKW·26s installed in NS
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Paper codes were archaic solutions
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The Early Years ofSecure Speech Voi
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But his memo did not actually estab
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AFSAM-7 Several different systems,
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Thus wa
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 36. "NSA Review
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Chapter 6 Cryptology at Mid-decade
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the country, equipped with the fine
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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ecommended special decentralization
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The basic ground rule was that the
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was uninhabited, but was near a maj
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- _ .. - ------ It began with an in
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Fort Meade would be regarded as a P
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Chapter 7 The Eisenhower Reforms TH
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 The new NSCID m
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But this, said Baker, was not the w
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Ib) (3)
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) OGA a special study
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Ib) (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) (3)
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In that year, NSAEUR, over the stre
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------- / (1) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 I
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 f9P SEeRE i ~BR
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--------------~~~~ concerns that NS
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competent authority...." Other comp
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Beginning in 1939, a series ofmagaz
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Entirely apart from the well-known
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The Petersen Case (b) (6) Joseph Sy
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Martin and Mitchell duringtheir pre
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equired considerable planning, and
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Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~U~RA 8. Davids
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64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. I
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