National Threat Assessment 2008. Organised Crime - Politie
National Threat Assessment 2008. Organised Crime - Politie
National Threat Assessment 2008. Organised Crime - Politie
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The number of advance fee fraud cases is much higher than the number of<br />
reports. The Supraregional Investigation Team estimates that only 5 to 10% of<br />
all victims actually report advance fee fraud.<br />
Investment fraud<br />
The number of investment fraud cases is unknown. The Netherlands Authority<br />
for the Financial Markets (AFM) estimates the damage suffered as a result of<br />
illicit financial activities relating to securities at 400 to 500 million euros. This<br />
would be less than in 2005. The question remains whether this reflects reality,<br />
because possibilities of exemption have been extended. Investments of more<br />
than 50,000 euros, for example, are no longer monitored by the AFM. As a<br />
result, recent cases of debatable investments in a holiday complex in Turkey that<br />
was still to be built or in property in Dubai were not included in the figures.<br />
3.3.4 Criminal organisation<br />
West-African Criminal Networks (WACN), which are mostly responsible for<br />
advance fee fraud, are described as flexible networks, consisting of separate cells.<br />
They are also guilty of many other types of crime. The members are often<br />
acquaintances or relatives of each other, who collaborate intensively for a short<br />
period of time. This loose structure is typical of the WACN and ensures that the<br />
fraudsters can quickly respond to changing situations. The loose structure also<br />
makes them difficult to track down. A relatively large number of Dutch nationals<br />
with Nigerian backgrounds live in Amsterdam South-East; these people represent<br />
an attractive social network for the swindlers, who themselves are often in the<br />
Netherlands illegally. In combination with the international nature, anonymity,<br />
spirit of free enterprise and transit structure of the Netherlands, Amsterdam<br />
makes a suitable base of operations for this type of advance fee fraud. An<br />
analysis of cash flows confirms the impression that Nigerians in particular are<br />
guilty of this type of fraud. The cash flows to Nigeria and the numbers of unusual<br />
transactions performed by Nigerians exceed all transactions involving other West-<br />
African countries. A shift can also be observed in how transactions are carried out<br />
by victims and offenders. Less money is being transferred through banks; instead,<br />
greater use is being made of money transfers.<br />
Two variations were found with regard to the structure of the organisation.<br />
The first variant has a leader who provides a few other members of the cell with<br />
facilities, allowing them to contact the victims themselves. In the second variant<br />
the leader himself sends the emails to potential victims and other members are<br />
(a cell is) called in when the victim responds.<br />
chapter 3 – Fraud and money laundering<br />
109