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Great Ideas of Philosophy

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2. Decisions thus grounded are non-moral, because they arise from our natures not as rational beings butmerely as human beings: They are essentially reactions.B. The categorical imperative, on the other hand, declares an action to be morally necessary in itself, withoutreference to any purpose.1. Morality begins with a rational and autonomous being in the intelligible realm, where we are called onto have reasons for action.2. We must find a rule or precept or principle that guides actions <strong>of</strong> a given kind and that is universal.IV. The categorical imperative is not tied to a particular desire or impulse or motive; rather, it asserts its own moralauthority.A. One <strong>of</strong> the characteristics <strong>of</strong> a moral precept is that it’s universalizable, not tied to a particular conditionand, hence, dependent on the contingent facts <strong>of</strong> the natural world.B. Moral maxims, as reasons for acting, are applicable to all situations in which generically that given kind <strong>of</strong>action might take place.1. The categorical imperative is not tied to a particular desire or impulse or motive; rather, it asserts itsown moral authority.2. The authority <strong>of</strong> the imperative is contained in the maxim itself, not something that it brings about, notsome contingent outcome.C. John Stuart Mill believed that Kant’s categorical imperative was a license to perform absolutely hideousacts.1. Kant’s pure categories <strong>of</strong> the understanding do not supply content but the framework governing thepossibility <strong>of</strong> understanding.2. Kant advised that we “act in such a way that the maxim <strong>of</strong> your action would, if you were able, beinstituted as a universal law <strong>of</strong> nature.”3. What troubled Mill was the prospect <strong>of</strong>, say, an arsonist invoking the categorical imperative andwishing to install as a universal law <strong>of</strong> nature the successful destruction <strong>of</strong> property by fire.D. This fear can arise only from a misunderstanding <strong>of</strong> Kant’s entire argument.1. Any ignoble end or any end whatever tied to considerations <strong>of</strong> pleasure or keen desire or emotioncomes under the heading <strong>of</strong> a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical imperative.2. The imperative is a law the will gives to itself. There are sufficient resources within Kantian moralthought to rule out arson as a candidate universal law!E. Kant <strong>of</strong>fers another version <strong>of</strong> the categorical imperative: “Man is never merely a means to an end, butalways an end unto himself.”1. To use another person as a means or a tool is to deny that person the very moral autonomy on which“right” and “wrong” become possible.2. To do so would mean that you qualify for the same treatment. As Abraham Lincoln said, “As I wouldnot be a slave, I would not be a master.”3. Kant is famous for concluding from this that one must never lie. If Smith lies to Jones to get Jones todo something that Jones would not do if properly informed, Smith trumps Jones’s moral autonomy,thus violating the categorical imperative.V. Kant’s epitaph summarizes much about him: “The starry sky above him, the moral law within him.” Kant givesus moral law, not as a means to seek pleasure or avoid pain, but as a way <strong>of</strong> doing the right thing and, thus,substantiating ourselves as moral beings.Recommended Reading:Kant, I. Critique <strong>of</strong> Practical Reason. Cambridge, 1997.———. Groundwork <strong>of</strong> the Metaphysic <strong>of</strong> Morals. H. Paton, trans. Cambridge University Press, 1998.32©2004 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership

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