Great Ideas of Philosophy

B. The inclination to classify is as common in childhood as it is in science and philosophy.1. One of the most general concepts employed in classifying things is that of essentiality. Certain objectsare understood to be essentially what they are, no matter what merely accidental differences obtainamong them (that is, all varieties of apples are still, essentially, apples).2. The “essence” of a thing is not limited by its observable features, but arises from a conception of someinternal, intrinsic feature that causally brings about these features.3. Among these features is the concept of executive causation, the concept of a central cause thataccounts for the observed properties of an object.4. Ruled out by this are properties that are merely correlated with the object.IV. Taking an event or object to be what it is “essentially,” however, raises the question about the nature of“universals” and the relationship between universals and particulars.A. Some followers of Socrates thought that a higher-order plane or reality was necessary for particular thingsto have the properties they have. In other words, the actual particular “types” of things have their definingproperties in virtue of the universal of which they are but instances.B. Aristotle rejected this view, insisting that properties inhere only in particulars.C. Medieval philosophy showed renewed interest in the so-called nominalist-realist controversy. Nominalistsinsisted that universals were the names given to collectives of particulars. Realists argued that the universalhad to be real; otherwise, the particulars would have nothing from which to derive their essential natures.D. Peter Abelard (1079–1142) made clear that universals are references to how we have conceptualized ourexperiences.1. Nonetheless, he granted validity to the realists’ position, because universals encompass a limitlessnumber of possible experiences.2. For instance, the term mankind is the conceptualized category into which we would validly place anindefinitely large number of instances; there is no “mankind,” as such, just men, women, and children.E. Locke distinguished between what he called the “nominal” and the “real” essence of things.1. The real essence of an object is determined by its ultimate microstructure, which we cannot perceive.2. But on the basis of experience, we come to treat certain reliable ensembles of properties as instances ofa certain type of thing, thus giving the object its nominal essence.V. On this account, ontological issues arise from different levels of reality—as perceived, as conceptualized, andas constructed by discourse.A. At one level of reality, cyanide gas is a chemical composed of certain elements. At another level, the gas isa poison. And at still another level, it has been used suicidally. Is any one level in some way more “real”than the others?B. Questions of “real being” also are complicated by development and change, metamorphosis and evolution.Though favoring conditions will cause a large oak tree to arise from an acorn, none of the superficialfeatures of acorns predicts or explains the oak tree.C. In his Being and Time, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) made a sharp distinction between existence andessence.1. There is nothing “essential” about something before its existence.2. Man acts as though he were the master and shaper of language, but in fact, language remains themaster of man.D. The American philosopher Richard Rorty suggested that we give our own version of competing accountspriority in order to preserve solidarity. Thus, ontology becomes a branch of sociology.1. Rorty said, “Truth is simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying their way.”2. We attribute “truth” to sentences that allow us to get on with things, to get things done.E. Against this line of thinking appears Roger Penrose, distinguished for his work in mathematics, whoargued that the perceived reality is grounded in a mind-independent reality. What really exists, then, areformal relational properties constitutive of the cosmos and subject to mathematical representation.F. In his PersonalKnowledge, the scientist-philosopher, Michael Polyani (1891–1976) opposed the notion ofscience as value-free, purely rational and empirical, fact-based and systematic.8©2004 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership