Box 1: How does Somalia’s private sector cope without government?Private business has done surprisingly well in Somalia although government has been extremely weak or absent in major partsof the country since 1991.In spite of very rudimentary finance and infrastructure services, private business has thrived in vital sectors (e.g. retail,construction) where transactions can be kept simple. Results achieved by private entrepreneurs have also been impressivein more complex or capital-intensive sectors (e.g. telecommunications, electricity) though some of the solutions may havebeen far from ideal. Even in some activities traditionally reserved for the public sectors (e.g. legal and education systems,monetary policy), where the absence of government can severely jeopardize development, the private sector has been ableto find creative solutions.Although there have been many failings, the large number of success stories is nevertheless striking and attests to the vitalityand resourcefulness of private business in even the most inhospitable environments.The factors that have helped to foster the natural drive of private entrepreneurs can be summarized as follows:a) “importing governance” by using foreign institutions and networks where these are missing locally ( e.g.airline safety);b) “relying on clan systems and networks of trust” to help with contract enforcement, and international andnational fund transfers (hawala system and rotating credit associations);c) “simplifying transactions” and breaking down operations into parts that are manageable by privateentrepreneurs without government or outside help.Conclusion: “For governments and aid agencies, the capability of some business sectors to cope under the most difficultconditions should give hope and guidance in other reconstruction efforts. It may take less encouragement than is commonlythought for stripped-down systems of finance, electricity, and telecommunications to grow.”This summary is based on an article co-authored by Tatiana Nenova and Tim Harford of the World Bank-International FinanceCorporation. It can be found at http://rru.worldbank.org/PublicPolicyJournal. The article generated a rich discussion on therelative roles of the private sector and government in weak states. This discussion may be accessed through the same site.2.5.2. SMEsThe ILO, the World Bank and other relevant IGOs have well-tried policy tools thatare appropriate for promoting local economic development and SMEs in general. 21 Suitablyadapted, these are appropriate for use in crisis response, in both conflict- and disasteraffectedcountries. They include:• Assistance with public employment services, which are needed as much by enterprisesas by government and job-seekers, and which play a critical role in crisis response.• Employment-intensive infrastructure reconstruction not only makes it possible forlocal firms and workers to capture a larger share of the reconstruction expenditure thanother approaches. It can also be competitive in terms of cost and quality, and thosetypes of projects where it excels (such as rural roads, and irrigation schemes) benefitespecially rural areas, which are too frequently neglected in reconstructionprogrammes. It is important to pay sufficient attention to the identification,development and training of local contractors who know how to use these techniques. 22In Ghana, associations of labour-based contractors have recently been established, andthey have multiplied the impact of ILO training programmes.• The concept of Local Economic Development not only is compatible with but dependscritically on the participation of the private sector. Its tools include businessdevelopment services, employability enhancement, social finance schemes, the21 A. Tolentino, Guidelines for the analysis of policies and programmes for small and medium enterprisedevelopment, ILO, Enterprise and Management Development Working Paper EMD/13/E.22 Peter Bentall, Andreas Beusch and Jan de Veen, Employment-Intensive Infrastructure Programmes: CapacityBuilding for Contracting in the Construction Sector—Guidelines, Geneva: ILO, 1999; and ILO, Employmentintensive reconstruction works in countries emerging from armed conflicts—Guidelines, 1999.20
promotion of employment-friendly investments, and social dialogue principles andtechniques. 23 A noteworthy feature of the concept is that entrepreneurs and socialpartners are fully engaged in developing the economic recovery / developmentstrategy. The expression Local Economic Recovery is sometimes used to refer toshorter-term, more focused strategies, as is usually appropriate to post-crisisenvironments.• Microfinance and other small financial institutions that can respond to the needs ofinformal and small formal sector enterprises are critical. 24 The vital role of finance isclear in one case study of crisis-affected countries after another; the papers on Iraq andMacedonia are examples. Repeatedly, small entrepreneurs complain of the difficulty ofgetting credit, especially from commercial banks, and of the onerous terms on which itis offered when it is available. Recently there have been encouraging developments onthis front; they are discussed in the following section.2.5.3. MNEsMNE decisions to invest or not in areas affected by crisis—to stay in countries wherethey are already established, rather than leave, and to go into countries where they do notyet have a presence—are normally taken for commercial reasons. They may be influencedat the margin by broader considerations of corporate social responsibility, but where thecommitment is sizable and long-term, the business case needs to be solid. This sectionexplores the determinants of MNE investment decisions in order to better understand whatpolicies and conditions might lead to increased levels of investment.As regards countries still undergoing conflict, light was shed on this question by asurvey of 25 MNE managers overseeing their companies’ operations in countries that werethe scene of conflicts, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Congo, Georgia,Kazakhstan, Indonesia, UK-Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka. Critical factors affecting thecompany’s willingness to continue operations in the country were found to be whether theconflict was predictably limited to a certain part of the country or could otherwise beexpected to be territorially contained—for example, urban investments would be retainedif the conflict took place only in rural areas; whether the government (or in some cases thecompany, using its own security personnel) was able to defend the investment-intensiveareas; and whether the conflict was limited to occasional terrorist acts or rebel incursionsinto government-controlled territory, which in some sectors could be accepted as a cost ofdoing business. 25In countries emerging from conflict, the first point to make is that all of the generalfactors that MNE managers consider when contemplating investment in non-crisiscountries also apply to countries affected by crisis. These include whether the potentialrewards justify the commercial risks; whether non-commercial risks such as thosestemming from government regulation or political change are acceptable; whether theproject fits the firm’s business model; and whether the commercial environment in thecountry (e.g. respect for contracts, efficient financial and judicial institutions, reasonablelevel of “red tape”) is satisfactory. In countries affected by crisis several of these variablesare likely to give more negative readings than under normal conditions; in the case of therisk factor, the higher risk might be accompanied by higher potential reward. In addition23Martiin Gasser, Carmelo Salzano, Roberto di Meglio, and Alfredo Lazarte-Hoyle, Local EconomicDevelopment in Post-Crisis Situations, Geneva: ILO, 2002.24 Geetha Nagarajan, Developing Financial Institutions in Conflict Affected Countries: Emerging Issues, FirstLessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead, Geneva, ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship Trainingfor Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict, 1997. More recent information on developments in numerouscountries (Angola, Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, and Uganda) can beaccessed through the web site http://topics.developmentgateway.org/microfinance.25 Jonathan Berman, “Boardrooms and bombs”, Harvard International Review, 22 (3), Fall 2000.21
- Page 1 and 2: HEI-ILO Research Programme onStreng
- Page 3: PrefaceThis three-volume series res
- Page 7 and 8: Table of contentsPreface...........
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- Page 13: Executive summaryPrivate enterprise
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- Page 42 and 43: partners, the tripartite cooperatio
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- Page 48: AcknowledgmentsThe authors of this
- Page 51 and 52: 6.2. Delimiters of women’s econom
- Page 54 and 55: Executive summaryDespite the rich n
- Page 56 and 57: 1. IntroductionSince 1979, under th
- Page 58 and 59: 2. Country profileThe Republic of I
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- Page 62 and 63: for university education concerning
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Feasibility study: almost all respo
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Table 9: Percentage of female entre
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Factors for public sector preferenc
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The recessionary indication of busi
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Special investment legislation and
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8. Small entrepreneurs in Iraq: Sto
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a reasonable income and independenc
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9. RecommendationsSME-development s
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Longer-term SME developmentBesides
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• literature and artistic service
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2. List of interviews with governme
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11. Why did you decide establishing
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33. What are the cost components of
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59. Are you working on a project, o
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Promoting multi-ethnic stakeholder
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101
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Research methodologyThe research te
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possibility of conflict. In 1992, a
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2.2.2. PovertyAfter the break-up of
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of almost 10 per cent of GDP, yet i
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Source of initial financing: privat
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‘It is important to point out tha
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4.2. The economic resilience of int
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medium-sized companies employing 24
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5.2. Addressing constraints for SME
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5.4. Support to local initiativesSM
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ConclusionConsidering the actual an
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Scott, Norman: Macedonia: A Brief E
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Official gross reserves 4 290 450 7
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4. Survey questionnaire1. Name of t
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139
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141
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143
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2. Le contexte2.1. Le paradoxe ango
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Composition et description des Futu
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Les généraux angolais sont prése
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Les syndicats officielsL’Union na
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Une étude réalisée en 2003 pour
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3.3. Sortir du cercle vicieux : vie
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Annexes1. Morceaux choisis : le «
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159
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L’implication des partenaires soc
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Table des matièresTable des matiè
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RemerciementsQu’il me soit permis
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Liste des acronymesAFASPAALEANEAANS
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GlossaireAide d’urgence :Aléa :A
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Résumé exécutifAu cours des dix
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1. IntroductionLe département de R
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Limites de l’étudeAvant de proc
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évalué à plus de deux milliards
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2.2.2. Aspects démographiquesLes p
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2.3.3. EducationDès l’indépenda
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création de fonds de stabilisation
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3. Analyse des formes de réponse :
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• le secteur de l’Eau sera dest
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• la révision de la législation
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de main-d’œuvre, encourageant la
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leur fournissait les équipements e
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matérielle sous des formes diverse
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centre de l’attention des partena
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• le rôle dévolu à la commissi
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Renforcer le rôle de solidarité d
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ConclusionLa dimension de la tache
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Equipe Multidisciplinaire pour l’
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2. Séries statistiquesTable 8 : Ev
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Table 11 : Répartition de la popul
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Table 2 : Liste détaillée des com
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Table 4 : Dispositif d’interventi
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Organisation de l’unité syndical
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- Centre technique de construction.
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