Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 89approximate what Ding referred to as a ‘counter-elite’ within the state structures(see chapter two).Despite their diversity of backgrounds and views, many of ICMI’sintelligentsia shared at least one common goal. That is, they regarded ICMI ashaving provided them with a useful vehicle for gaining access to those in power,thereby enabling them in theory to pursue their own agendas and exert influenceon state agencies, officials, and policy-making. ICMI also gave them protectionfrom ABRI. Most of them were prepared publicly to support Suharto in returnfor Suharto’s protection and the political opportunities (patronage) that theyhoped such support would offer them. They argued that under Suharto’s andHabibie’s paternalistic protection, ICMI would enjoy the necessary hothouseconditions to establish itself as part of the New Order’s institutionalstructure. They held a long-term view that ICMI could outlive Suharto andHabibie’s leadership and look forward to a more independent role in a post-Suharto political constellation. Much of the ICMI intelligentsia, like Ding’sincorporated ‘counter-elite’, therefore, sought eventually to displace the officialgoals of ICMI with their own private agendas and goals. 58 Incorporation in ICMIhad occurred during a period of limited political opening—itself, largely aproduct of the growing intra-elite rivalry between Suharto and ABRI (seechapter seven). Under these circumstances, there was the risk that Musliminterests would become re-politicised after Suharto, for the past two decades, hadsought to demobilise and neutralise them through strategies of exclusion.Suharto’s regime was certainly not prepared to let this happen and was quickto establish tight control of ICMI and to surround its most independent andradical members, the main target of co-option, with government bureaucrats andpro-regime Muslim conservatives. By early 1991, Habibie had imposed anorganisational command structure upon the association to constrain the variouspolitical agendas of the intelligentsia and provide close supervision over itsprograms and activities. He appointed to managerial positions his trusted staff ofbureaucrats and ‘technologists’ from the Agency of Research, Technology andApplication (BPPT) and from his ministry. In addition, he oversaw theestablishment of a council of advisors (comprising pro-regime figures, retired stateand military officials and respected Muslim elders) as a moderating andbalancing mechanism to the council of experts (comprised largely ofintelligentsia). In August 1993, in his capacity as a private citizen, Suhartobecame the chief patron of ICMI, with three former vice-presidents joining thedewan pembina (supervisor’s council) to oversee the operations of ICMI. 59Thus, ICMI became a vehicle for the recruitment of elite members into thestate bureaucracy and other centres of power. It became a repository ofofficialdom as membership of ICMI (and Golkar) was viewed as a ticket tocareer advancement within the bureaucracy and cabinet. From the point of viewof aspirants to power, then, incorporation provided a conveyer-belt to higherpositions of office. The corporatist organisations also acted as ‘intermediatechannels’ of recruitment. As such, they behaved like sorting machines, letting