Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

236 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAand society, and reform of the political system including a process ofdemilitarisation. This brings us to the observation that the broader the interestsabsorbed into state arrangements, the more likely it is that those interests wouldmake demands for their full representation in the system. Correspondingly, thiswould produce pressures for a change in the nature of the political system as anincreasing number of interests competed for access to political goods.Second, although Suharto neutralised the most outspoken ICMI members whocriticised his presidency, the mobilisation of Muslim support behind hispresidency and against opponents created a reaction from disaffected membersof the elite, especially from those who had been displaced from power by thenewly-incorporated Muslim interests. An increasing number of the sidelinedmembers of the elite and regime opponents began to organise alternative vehiclesfor their political participation outside of the corporatist arrangements, for reinclusionin a ‘reformed’ political system, and in protest against the state-Islamicaccommodation. In short, corporatist inclusion of Muslim interests hadcontributed to a re-politicisation and multiplication of organised group interestsdemanding participation.Consequently, the institutions of authoritarianism were showing signs ofdecay, because they were no longer able to contain, channel, neutralise, or coopteffectively the diversifying demands and challenges of society. Suharto’scounter-mobilisation of incorporated Muslim interests and other pro-regimegroups against dissent had the effect of further politicising state-society relations.In these circumstances, the hardline military clampdown on dissent created deepsocial resentment and dismay, which, in the context of the 1997–1998 economiccollapse, triggered further oppositional mobilisations against Suharto’s rule.Recourse to crude state repression and terror was a clear sign that corporatismwas failing as a strategy for the containment of society’s latest associationaldynamism.In light of the political and economic crises, an analysis was made of whethercaptured Muslim interests contributed to anti-regime organisation, or whetherthey reinforced the authoritarian structures of the Suharto regime. To what extentwere Muslim responses to pluralist challenges conditioned by their own locationinside or outside of the state corporatist arrangements? The simple answer is thatMuslim responses both to Suharto’s rule and to the growing pluralist challengeswere conditioned, but not wholly determined, by their location inside corporatistarrangements insofar as Muslim leaders perceived that they could gain politicaladvantage from their incorporation. More broadly, calculations of relativeadvantage and disadvantage vis-à-vis rival political interests in contests for powerin an anticipated post-Suharto period greatly influenced the positions adopted byincorporated (and unincorporated) interests.Thus, Suharto was able to mobilise Muslim political opinion against the prodemocracy/pro-Megawatiforces in 1997, not just because of the state- military’ssophisticated propaganda campaign, but also because Muslim leaders at the timeperceived Megawati to be a threat to their own political ambitions. In particular,