Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 141acknowledged this conflict, pointing to the fact that ‘nationalist’ officers ‘werethe ones who felt threatened by ICMI because they saw ICMI as[synonymous with] Habibie. Everything that Habibie does at the bureaucraticlevel in regard to jobs and money…in their [the nationalists’] thinking they willattack ICMI.’ 45Perhaps in cognisance of the potential for destabilising conflicts, the Suhartoregime fostered a conciliatory approach to Muslim interests providing they didnot manifest themselves as organised political demands. At the same time, oncehe had successfully established his control over an acquiescent ABRI leadership,he sought to placate ABRI’s concerns about the re-politicisation of Islam. Assuch, Suharto and his ministers made numerous announcements to try to assuageABRI’s suspicions of Islamisation, and as firm warnings to the ICMIintelligentsia. They declared that ICMI’s activities were neither directed towardsIslamisation or to the establishment of a political organisation or pressure group.They also vociferously denied claims that ICMI constituted a pro-Golkar/pro-Suharto power block before the 1992 general elections and Golkar’s 1993national congress. The public denials failed to mollify deep-seated suspicions ofHabibie, driven, as they were, by the awareness that Suharto was using Habibieand Islam in order to diminish the political influence and institutional autonomyof the armed forces.Which Military Opposes ICMI?ICMI-military antagonisms partly reflected the psychology of winners and losers,in an eminently excluding and including power game of divide-and-rule. Militaryofficers most inclined to attack ICMI and its chairman were those who wereassociated with Benny’s declining influence, or had been ousted from strategicand political posts by Habibie’s increasing power. Conversely, other santri(orthodox Muslim) generals who had gained promotions, either as a result of theouster of Benny’s forces, or because of association with Habibie, tended toendorse the ICMI chairman and praise ICMI publicly. Ultimately, PresidentSuharto promoted the new generation of Muslim generals as part of his divideand-ruletactics to increase his own autonomy vis-à-vis ABRI.The promotion of younger military officers caused a long-standing debate inthe media and among Indonesian analysts, about a rift in ABRI between the socalled‘green (Muslim)’ officers and ‘red-and-white (nationalist)’ officers. Thenew Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung (appointed inMay 1993)—who, according to one view may have gained his promotionbecause of his links with the technology minister—was one of the risinggeneration of Muslim officers. As ABRI commander, Feisal oversaw the purgingof Benny’s intelligence network. 48 Shortly after assuming office in May 1993,Feisal ingratiated himself to Habibie and ICMI by praising the organisation forwhat he said was its dynamic role in assisting the military with its stability anddevelopment goals. 49 Feisal was responsible for promoting Muslim officers up