Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 181campaign restrictions were undemocratic and that the party would disregard therules. PPP also approved a boycott of the elections by seven branches in CentralJava in response to the refusal by the police to permit public campaigning in thatprovince. 76In addition to the government’s campaign restrictions, one of the main factorsthat reportedly sparked PPP reactions was Golkar’s crusade to turn towns andstreets yellow as it painted public facilities, buildings, vehicles and roadsides inits party colour. Consequently, street battles were commonly provoked by tit-fortatexchanges that typically began either with one party removing the streetbanners, posters and flags of another, or with exchanges of taunts followed byrock throwing and clashes, with sometimes serious casualties. 77Central Java was the scene of the earliest and initially worst campaignviolence. Central Java’s northern coastal town of Pekalongan, one of the few townsin Indonesia held by PPP, recorded the first major instance of campaign-relatedviolence in late March 1997, one month before the official campaign period.Angry PPP supporters, joined by locals (and Megawati sympathisers), burntdown a stage that was to host a Golkar rally by Suharto’s daughter, SitiRukmana. Local Muslims expressed outrage over the fact that the stage waserected in an Islamic boarding schoolyard next to a mosque, and that Golkar usedIslam ‘superficially’ in its campaign to attract supporters. They were incensed bythe fact that the popular Muslim musician, Rhoma Irama, and the equallypopular preacher, Zainuddin MZ—previously PPP campaigners—had movedover to Golkar, and that Golkar had the temerity to campaign in this PPPbailiwick. The East Java police later arrested a Muslim preacher for his allegeduse of prayer meetings to stir up anti-government sentiment in which heapparently criticised both Suharto’s daughter and the Golkar Chair Harmoko, andcalled Rhoma and Zainuddin traitors to Islam. 78The burning of the stage was provoked initially by a dispute over the removalof PPP flags by Golkar rally organisers. The incident spilled over into massiveanti-government riots, which deteriorated into attacks against the commercialand residential properties of Indonesia’s ethnic-Chinese minority, the usualscapegoat of political and social tensions in Indonesia. 79Pekalongan, and surrounding districts and towns, remained flashpoints ofviolent clashes between PPP supporters and Golkar supporters from March to theend of the campaign in late May. In early May, outside of Pekalongan town, PPPmobs attacked a housing complex for civil servants and Chinese. They reportedlythrew molotov cocktail bombs into the houses, burnt the contents and yelled‘Hang Suharto!’ 80 Among the districts in Central Java that continued toexperience unrest were Kudus, Jepara, Demak, Rembang, Magelang, Kendal,Semarang, Wonosobo, Banjarnegara, Solo, Surakarta and Yogyakarta—allcontaining significant PPP pockets and therefore constituting major targets ofGolkar’s aggressive campaign. On numerous occasions, PPP crowds confrontedheavily-armed anti-riot troops, who sometimes unleashed volleys of rubberbullets, tear gas and water canons to break up rallies. On one occasion in Kudus,
182 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAPPP supporters clashed with anti-riot police when holding a campaign boycottover the regent’s issuance of a regulation banning PPP’s vehicle and motorcyclecavalcades. 81In some of these districts and towns, PPP leaders complained about the use,especially by Golkar-affiliate youth organisations, of thugs against PPP rallies.The Yogyakarta chapter of PPP decided to withdraw from the campaign afterGolkar’s militant youths attacked PPP supporters returning home from a rally inKotagede and damaged the PPP branch office in Yogyakarta. There were somereports of thugs wearing Ninja outfits attacking PPP’s branch offices. ThePPP also gave accounts of ‘preman’-type activities in Wonosobo, Banjarnegaraand other districts, in which knife-wielding and rock-throwing youths incitedpay-back raids on villages and PPP convoys. Blaming paid thugs for instigatingwhat otherwise would appear to have been PPP-directed violence was sometimespossibly motivated by the desire to clear PPP’s image of brutality. The NewOrder state was, nevertheless, known for its deployment of ‘preman’ to achievecertain political ends, and PPP leaders claimed that it was to tarnish theopposition party’s image and reduce its appeal for electorates. 82Similar riots and street clashes occurred in PPP strongholds in East Javaprovince, in the districts and towns of Bangkalan (Madura), Surabaya, Pasuruan,Gresik, Jombang, Bondowoso, Malang, Jember and Banyuwangi. A report by thePasuruan branch of the NU on 7 May 1997 captured the campaign-relatedconflict by the opposing Golkar and PPP supporters in that district. The reportnoted that on PPP rally days, its supporters displayed total disrespect forreligious leaders who supported Golkar, throwing insults at them. PPP supporterstore down Golkar banners, and damaged parked vehicles, while at Golkar rallies,PPP supporters carrying sharp weapons clashed with Golkar campaigners andsecurity police. 83The closing days of the official campaign recorded the greatest amount ofviolence and bloodshed. In Jakarta, PPP supporters eclipsed Golkar rallies withJakarta’s traffic heavily congested or brought to a standstill. In PPP pockets inJakarta’s poorer suburbs, such as Cawang, Kampung Melayu, Depok and Ciputatrioting and street battles broke out between convoys of PPP sympathisers andanti-riot forces and Golkar supporters. On 23 May, the last day of the campaign,PPP supporters in a retaliatory raid against Golkar sacked the trading city ofBanjarmasin. Reportedly, Golkar campaigners on motorcycles, who werecreating a din outside of a mosque during mid-day prayer, incited the PPPsupporters into violence. Jakarta had to send in crack troops to bring peace to thecity, after a day of carnage, which left over 100 people dead. The election periodleft an estimated 300 people dead and hundreds wounded, although a large numberof campaign-related deaths were due to traffic accidents. By any account, thiswas an historical calamity. 84One of the outstanding points about the campaign rallies, was that PPPsupporters continued to enter the streets by their thousands to vent theirfrustrations against the regime, even after the more moderate national and
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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