Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 131Taking into account the above-mentioned points, the chapter examines theinteractions between corporatised and other state interests. The analysisconsiders the idea that, in order to preserve his power, Suharto periodicallyreadjusted the balance between corporatised civilian interests in Golkar andICMI and rival interests in the state. In short, corporatist organisations servedSuharto’s strategy of divide-and-rule, especially as both ICMI and Golkar weredrawn into intra-elite rivalries.ARMED FORCES-ICMI RIVALRYThe military was becoming the clear loser in the contest over the futuresuccession of an ageing president, as Suharto surrounded himself with loyalistsand family members in what was becoming an increasingly personalist regime.Suharto progressively promoted to the country’s political institutions civilianalternatives to military men, as he and the military leadership competed over thechoice of candidate for the vice-presidency in 1988, 1993, and 1998. The chapterwill look at how political interests of the president and ABRI diverged, asSuharto’s support base contracted with the rise of a civilian oligarchy (i.e.,privileged families). Suharto loyalists and family members were promoted up themilitary hierarchy and were strictly subordinated to Suharto’s rule, therebygreatly reducing ABRI’s autonomy.Before proceeding further, the analysis distinguishes between those elementsin ABRI, who had been hurt by the rise of civilian/Muslim interests and wereopposed to ICMI, and Suharto loyalists and beneficiaries within ABRI, who didnot openly object to ICMI. Among the military officers most antagonistic towardsICMI were those associated with Gen. Benny Murdani (discussed below). UnderBenny’s command the military had established a considerable degree ofinstitutional autonomy from the president and now this autonomy was beingcompromised by the reconfiguration of civilian-Muslim interests behind Suharto.Benny, and two successive commanders of ABRI, Gen. Try Sutrisno and Gen.Edi Sudrajat, belonged to the so-called ‘nationalist’ officers, who were opposedto the establishment of formal linkages between political Islam and the state.ABRI elements that did not openly oppose ICMI included the so-called ‘green’ or‘Muslim’ officers, Suharto loyalists, and family members, who were the newbeneficiaries of power arrangements but had become very subordinate toSuharto’s authority.The first group of disgruntled military officers particularly disliked civilianleaders like the Minister of Technology B.J.Habibie and Golkar chairmen,Sudharmono and Harmoko, because of the role they played in assisting Suhartoto reduce his reliance on support from the armed forces. First, underSudharmono’s leadership, the State Secretariat and Golkar became Suharto’smain instrument of civilian elite recruitment into the country’s politicalinstitutions and government bureaucracy. Then ICMI, under Habibie’schairmanship, assumed the role as one of Suharto’s chief instruments of civilian
132 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYrecruitment to offset ABRI. It appears that both ICMI and Golkar servedas instruments for Suharto’s wider divide-and-rule strategies, as he readjusted ashifting balance of forces in his favour. Consequently, significant elements of themilitary leadership, who had initially opposed Sudharmono’s leadership ofGolkar were hostile to cosy state-Islamic relations and Habibie-ICMI interests.The chapter also considers that aggravating these tensions was the noticeablecongruence between the ICMI discourse on de-militarisation of society andSuharto’s measures to create an acquiescent military leadership subordinate tohis authority. Reinforcing this hostility towards ICMI was the military’shistorical prejudice against Islamic political agendas, and the tendency of leadingmembers of the ICMI intelligentsia to consider the goal of demilitarisation asenhancing the objective of Islamising society. Perceptions that Habibie wasdrawing on Muslim support in ICMI in order to advance his political career andinterests at the expense of ABRI greatly contributed to animosities. The analysisnow turns to a fuller treatment of the points just raised.Purging Benny’s MenBeginning as one of Suharto’s inner-circle, Gen. Benny Murdani emerged as aserious threat to Suharto’s hold on power. Benny reached the zenith of his powerin the years after 1983, when concurrently holding positions of commander-inchiefof the armed forces, chief of the Command for the Restoration of Securityand Order (Kopkamtib), with its extensive extra-judicial powers of arrest anddetainment, and head of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS). However,signs of conflict between Benny and the president had appeared by 1988,especially after Suharto appointed Sudharmono as vice-president against themilitary leadership’s wishes. 2A number of active-duty leaders (associates of Benny) began to withdrawtheir support from Suharto, following which Suharto courted the Muslimconstituency to offset their support. The military under Benny’s commandopposed Sudharmono’s nomination to the vice-presidency, and Kopkamtibembarked on a campaign to discredit Sudharmono’s chairmanship of Golkar, byclaiming that the ruling party had been infiltrated by communists. Suhartoretaliated and, in September 1988, liquidated Kopkamtib and replaced it with theinstitutionally less independent and more ‘civilianised’ Bakorstanas. WithSudharmono becoming vice-president, Suharto kicked Benny up-stairs to whatwas then the less powerful position of Minister of Defence and Security.However, Benny turned the Ministry into a major power base for himself,retained control over BAIS, and remained an intolerable threat to Suharto.Suharto moved to emasculate further the intelligence network loyal to Benny. InJanuary 1994, BAIS was renamed the ABRI Intelligence Agency (BIA) and its‘previous operational independence’ under Benny ‘was curtailed’. 3Between 1988 and 1993, Suharto took measures to purge his rivals within themilitary from the government’s political institutions, including Golkar and
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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