Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISATIONS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 177accompanied Siti on her regular rounds of rural pesantren in the two provinces todrum up support for Golkar. He caused a controversy when, on 13 March 1996,he announced before a gathering of Golkar supporters in Central Java thatmembers of the armed forces were Golkar cadres. Wearing a grey Safari suit andyellow Golkar jacket, he stood beside Siti and declared that, ‘as a Golkar cadre’,he ‘took his orders from the head of the Central Committee’. 59 The next day, atSabilil Muttaqin Pesantren in Magetan, East Java, he repeated his comments. Inanother publicity stunt, Siti Rukmana gave her strong endorsement to Gen.Hartono, the new Minister of Information, when he joined ICMI’s and MUI’ssenior advisory boards. This manoeuvre was undoubtedly aimed at consolidatingthe support of Muslims behind Golkar, at a time when some of that support mayhave been in doubt. 60Hartono’s statements outraged leaders of PPP and PDI, and the ABRIleadership, which was supposed to maintain a non-partisan stance toward thethree parties, sought to distance itself from his comments. Nonetheless, hisstrident assertions highlighted the intensity of competition that was mounting inthe pre-campaign months in which Golkar, with ABRI’s backing, was launchingan early and aggressive foray into Muslim and PDI constituencies. In January1996, Harmoko and Siti Rukmana appeared before tens of thousands of Golkarsupporters at Sri Wedari Stadium in Solo, Central Java. In a symbolic gesture,Harmoko embraced a becak driver and promised to improve the working hoursfor labourers. 61 In doing so, Harmoko was attempting to appeal to the grassrootsin an effort to counter the popular appeal of Megawati’s PDI, in a like mannerthat Golkar sought to win the traditional Muslim vote from PPP.As mentioned in chapter six, Suharto pulled off a major coup by winning overthe NU Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid’s support to Golkar’s campaign, whothen facilitated Siti Rukmana’s visits to rural pesantrens to gain access to NU’sMuslim masses. In doing so, the government had shrewdly eliminated thepossibility of Abdurrahman bringing his NU constituency firmly behindMegawati’s PDI, as he had earlier intimated. With Abdurrahman’s s support, thegovernment also could continue to exploit divisions within Islam, as the NUchairman was a rival of PPP’s Chairman, Metareum, and was staunchly opposedto the rise of modernist Islam in ICMI. 62 This was at a time that PPP’s chairmanhad become increasingly critical of the government’s aggressive electioncampaigning, and Abdurrahman’s s apparent support for Golkar could bring asignificant portion of NU’s masses behind Golkar and act as an effective foil toPPP recalcitrance. Moreover, the support of NU’s constituency and ofincorporated Muslim (mainly) modernists behind Golkar, could significantlyreduce what limited influence PDI and PPP had in determining the outcome ofthe election campaign.Golkar’s early campaign-related activities stimulated reactions and counteractivitiesfrom PPP and PDI, as neither party wished to be totally sidelined bythe government’s powerful electioneering machine. In particular, PPP leaderscomplained about government-Golkar interference and intimidation aimed at
178 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAdriving their party supporters into retreat. For example, the Islamic magazine,Panji Masyarakat, aired opinions that sympathised with the plight of Megawati’sPDI faction and criticised Suharto’s government for interfering with the internalaffairs of both PDI and PPP. 63The usually cautious Chairman of PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, a figureacceptable to the government, who generally endorsed major governmentdecisions, began on this occasion to level caustic criticism against Golkar. Heexpressed his upset over the defection of around 3,000 PPP supporters whodeclared their allegiance to Golkar at a meeting in Sukabumi, West Java on 11March. Ismail accused Golkar of practising ‘political thuggery’ and claimed ithad rallied together disaffected PPP leaders and their supporters, bringing themto the gathering by bus at which PPP leaders were given Golkar jackets and partycards. On another occasion, Ismail called on the government to changeIndonesia’s election laws of 1985 so that they would be more open, honest andfair to all three parties. The Minister of Internal Affairs responded to some ofIsmail’s criticisms by insisting that PPP’s chairman was ill and, by implication,not fully in charge of his mental faculties, when he made his comments. 65The PPP chairman issued his complaints in response to what PPP leadersconsidered to be Golkar’s unfair practices, election fraud and intimidation at the1992 general elections and in anticipation of future unfair practices, whichseriously hurt PPP’s election chances, they claimed. Leaders of five PPPbranches declared that if Golkar’s unfair practices were repeated in 1997, theywould stage a walkout of parliament in rejection of the election results. 66 Reportsof Golkar’s unfair practices soon entered the media in 1996. For example, inJanuary, as PPP commemorated its anniversary, the party’s flags and bannerswere banned in Kendal, Sragen and Batang regencies, East Java. Written on thebanners were messages such as ‘It Is Not a Matter of Win-Lose, the GeneralElection Must be Honest and Fair’, The Matter Is to Uphold Justice’, and ‘PPPMust Always Be with the Muslims’. 67 The prohibition may have been reasonablehad Golkar not planned to hoist its own party flags and banners. In June, forinstance, leaders of the PPP-affiliated Development Youth Organisation inSurakarta, Central Java, lodged a complaint against a plan by Golkar’s youthaffiliate AMPI to hoist Golkar flags in 8,500 villages, one year before the officialcampaign date. 68By the commencement of the official campaign in April, PPP had assumedmuch of the mantle of opposition to Suharto’s government and to Golkar’selection campaign. Party leaders and campaigners of PPP saw clearly the historicopportunity handed to them with the decimation of Megawati’s PDI. As JusufSyakir, leader of the party council explainedwith the still chaotic situation in PDI, PPP sees the opportunity to recruit asmany as possible of Megawati’s PDI masses…PPP’s image as the partythat can defend as well as struggle for their interests must be upheld before
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Page 148 and 149: MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
Page 150 and 151: Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
Page 182 and 183: Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Page 236 and 237: Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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