Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 95the sixty-eight strong delegation from Aceh. In addition, the most senior leaderof NU, Rais Aam Ilyas Ruhiyat, who was also an active member of MUI’smanaging board, led the West Java delegation. 85In June 1996, the Golkar amalgam of thirty-one Islamic groups, FKOI, coordinatedby MDI, arranged a signed political statement recording a unanimousendorsement and prayer of support by thousands of Muslims for Suharto’srenomination. The Chairman of Golkar, Harmoko, and the Chairman of MUI,Hasan Basri, delivered speeches and witnessed the endorsement. Again, inMarch 1997, 150 Muslim leaders represented in MUI prayed at the state palacefor Suharto’s good health and next term in office. 86 ICMI did not join the othercorporatist organisations in declaring public support for Suharto, possiblybecause of its eagerness to deny earlier allegations that the association wasestablished as a support base for Suharto before the 1993 presidential election.However, this did not detract from the fact that ICMI still was a major pillar ofsupport for the Suharto regime.CONCLUSIONAlthough the New Order state’s corporatist initiatives spanned two to threedecades that witnessed state-Islamic relations shift from antagonism to closercollaboration, there emerged a common pattern. Throughout much of the NewOrder period, the regime sought to compartmentalise and fragment Musliminterests by capturing components (mosque, preachers’, ulama, dakwah,women’s, and intellectuals’ associations) of independent organisations (such asNU, Muhammadiyah, Dewan Dakwah, Persis) in state-chartered entities. Theamalgams were linked to government agencies and to Golkar so that thepotential for autonomous political organisation was subdued, deflected and underclose supervision. The regime re-channelled organisational activities into stateguideddevelopment oriented tasks and in support of Suharto’s presidency.ICMI shared similarities with the other corporatist initiatives. A broadspectrum of Islamic organisations and interests were brought into a peakorganisation for Muslim intellectuals. The grouping together of diverse politicalinterests within ICMI appeared to serve further Suharto’s strategy of stimulatingfragmentation, by bringing rival interests into the organisation. ICMI also soughtto absorb and re-channel the activities of the Muslim intelligentsia intodevelopment-oriented projects, in accordance with Habibie’s ‘iptek’ vision.However, ICMI was a product of state-Islamic accommodation. It wasestablished to co-opt strategic middle-strata elite into the existing powerarrangements, without providing them with sufficient means to endanger thestatus quo. If co-option failed to silence the dissension of individual members,they were excluded from incorporating arrangements and punished. Moreimportantly, ICMI was an example of the tactical deployment of incorporatedMuslim interests as a support base with which to counter-balance rival networksof power, such as influential segments of the military. This carried implications
96 THE CAPTURE OF MUSLIM INTERESTS INTO NON-PARTY ENTITIESbeyond earlier corporatist initiatives—namely, there was a risk that incorporatedMuslim interests would become re-politicised. This was after Suharto had goneto great pains to de-politicise Islam and de-mobilise Islam’s autonomousorganisational base.NOTES1. 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama, p.183.2. 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama, pp.191–223.3. Documents and official statements relating to ICMI place great stress on the role ofMuslim intellectuals in promoting projects of technological development, and therole of Islam in upholding national unity, defence and security. ‘Anggaran Dasardan Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ICMI)’; Suara Karya, 27 August 1993; Merdeka,26 August 1993.4. Interviews with S.M.Hidayat (head of MDI Secretariat), 12 November 1997; TotoTasmara (leader of BKRMI), 21 March 1997; ‘Daftar Anggota Forum KomunikasiOrmas Islam Karya-Kekaryaan’.5. Mardjoned, KH.Hasan Basri, p.154.6. Anlov and Cederroth, ‘Introduction’, p.9.7. Tempo, 30 May 1981.8. Mostly pro-government figures have held senior posts in MUI, including HasanBasri (a former Masyumi party leader) as chairman, the fomer vice-president ofNU’s syuriah council Ali Yafie, the Rector of the state-run Islamic TertiaryInstitute (IAIN), Quraish Shihab, and the President of NU’s syuriah council,KH.Ilyas Ruchiyat. ‘MUI Commission membership lists, Kep-180/MUI/IV/1996’,Jakarta.9. Jawa Pos, 12 August 1997; interview with Nasri Adlani (Secretary General ofMUI), 4 November 1997; Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council, p.60.10. 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama, p.102.11. See Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council, concerning the issuance of fatwa on thesubject of the mechanised slaughter of cattle (pp.96–7), the breeding andconsumption of rabbits (p.98), and the breeding and consumption of frogs (pp.99–100). In each case, the MUI fatwa served the purpose of assisting the governmentto overcome points of confusion that might cause controversy surrounding theestablishment and/or success of commercial projects. Ummat, 20 January 1997.12. Ummat, 20 January 1997; Gatra, 28 December 1996, 1 March 1997; ForumKeadilan, 23 December 1996.13. Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council, pp.63–4; Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics underSuharto, p.133.14. The lottery, with its first prize of one billion rupiah, held out the chance to millionsof Indonesia’s poorest section of society of obtaining luxury items otherwise out oftheir reach. The lottery also carried the high social cost of plunging addicts deeplyinto debt. The deleterious effects of the SDSB, and the fact of a disclosure thatMuslim organisations were receiving substantial funds from the lottery, arousedMuslim community anger and moral outrage. Muslim leaders called on the state to
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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