Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure of StateCorporatism?As part of regime maintenance and survival strategy, the Suharto regimeorganised state-society relations along exclusionary corporatist lines. Islamicorganisation was a major target of exclusionary arrangements. The exclusionarystrategy served three main purposes. One was to inhibit the autonomousorganisational capacity and demand making of group interests so that people’sparticipation in the formal political system would be greatly restricted andchallenges to the regime’s exercise of power would be minimised. Another wasto provide an institutional means of communication and linkage between stateand societal interests. This was done in order to ensure that communication withthe state occurred on the regime’s own terms, through these formal mechanisms,and not through alternative political vehicles. These mechanisms mostly servedto transmit government messages downwards to communities, but also as aninformation gathering mechanism to monitor society in order to identifycommunal antagonisms and political dissent before they threatened stability. Athird was to mobilise communities for various political and economicdevelopment objectives, which included mobilising support for Suharto’spresidency whilst neutralising the potential of that support to engage inindependent political action.In line with these purposes, corporatised interests had their energies andprogram activities diverted from overtly political concerns into New Orderdevelopment-oriented projects. Exclusionary corporatism, therefore, served adual, but inter-related, purpose of insulating the state from societal demandswhilst helping furnish the Suharto regime with support and legitimacy derivedfrom targeted political mobilisations of the populace and from the developmentorientation of organisational activities.Beyond Suharto’s strategies and objectives, the book examined Muslimresponses to Suharto’s political management of Islam and queried the extent towhich different Muslim interests embraced, became co-opted by, and/or resistedcapture by the state. An analysis was made of whether capture resulted insignificant political benefits and opportunities for the incorporated interests,or whether these interests were mostly denied strategic access to political goods(i.e., representation, policy input, and governmental office). Certainly from the1970s to the mid-1980s, there was a significant level of resistance to corporatist
234 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIAcapture (especially from NU) when relations between Suharto and Muslimpolitical interests largely were antagonistic. For those interests that had beencaptured in a variety of arrangements, corporatism mostly served to shut them outof power-sharing arrangements. However, this situation changed in the late1980s, with a rapprochement occurring between Suharto and Muslim leaders.There was a discernible shift in state corporatist strategy in general from anexclusionary one to one that appeared, on the surface at least, to be partiallyinclusionary. An indication of this shift was that Suharto widened the scope ofincorporation as he sought to co-opt strategic middle-strata elite (especiallyMuslims) into existing power arrangements behind his presidency. To this end,Golkar underwent a number of civilianisation and recruitment campaigns, andICMI was established as a new vehicle of Muslim support.In large numbers, Muslim leaders embraced ICMI as a sign of improvingrelations between Suharto and Islam. However, as Suharto expandedincorporation of new groups and extended state jurisdiction over Muslimcommunity organisation, he tried to maintain exclusionary corporatist barriers topeople’s participation in the political system. Muslim leaders discovered thattheir incorporation did not translate into commensurate political goods. AlthoughICMI leaders did gain some representation in the MPR and DPR, most of itsmembers were effectively denied meaningful participation in the political systemand were not rewarded with strategic positions in government. Nevertheless,ICMI members felt that, through incorporation, they had achieved substantialprogress—in terms of less military supervision of Muslim organisationalactivities, more freedom to organise and publicise Islamic ideas, and greateraccess to patronage and decision-makers.NU was divided in its responses to corporatist capture. On the one hand,several NU leaders and components of the organisation were drawn into statestructures, through Golkar, PPP, MUI, ICMI and other entities. On the other, theNU chairman represented orientations which resisted corporatist capture andstrove for NU’s political independence from the state.A central concern of the book was whether Suharto’s corporatist strategiesworked successfully as a mechanism for obstructing the growth of associationalpluralism. From the 1970s until the mid-1980s, it appears that strategies ofcorporatist exclusion did indeed inhibit associational pluralism. The enforcementin 1985 of Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of organisationalexistence was the pinnacle of these efforts backed by arrests of extremists.However, after 1988, the partial shift to inclusionary strategy had the effect of repoliticisinggroup interests after two decades of de-politicisation and corporatistexclusion. State capture of Muslim interests contributed to the organisation andcounter-organisation of competing group interests and to a concomitant increasein associational pluralism.Before elaborating this conclusion, however, there are a number of politicaland economic contexts which have to be considered in assessing the role ofcorporatism in facilitating societal pluralism in the post-1988 period. The
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
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Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
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xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
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xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
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xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
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xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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2 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN IN
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10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
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24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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38 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOC
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Chapter 5The Capture of Muslim Inte
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Page 204 and 205: MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
Page 214 and 215: Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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Page 256 and 257: CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
Page 262 and 263: ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
Page 264 and 265: REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
Page 266 and 267: REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
Page 268 and 269: REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
Page 270 and 271: REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
Page 272 and 273: REFERENCES 251National University,
Page 274 and 275: REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
Page 276 and 277: IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
Page 278 and 279: INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
Page 280: INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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