Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDONESIA 43Development Party (PPP). Thenceforth, PPP was part of the Golkar (plus-twoparties)system as a very unequal and distrusted partner in development. NUbecame the dominant element of PPP, with 61 per cent of the seats and effectiveveto over the other combined elements, particularly Parmusi (subsequently calledMuslimin Indonesia, MI). As such, five years after state incorporation of themodernists, the traditionalist NU was included in the corporatist partyarrangements.Since the merger, PPP comprised opposing tendencies between the modernistand traditionalist camps, with the main battle-lines in the future drawn betweenthe MI and NU factions. This appeared to be part of a deliberate strategy bySuharto to foster conflict within the parties in order to fragment them whileseeking to minimise conflict between political parties and Golkar. 18 Theprogovernment Parmusi Chairman, Mintaredja, became PPP’s first chairman. 19An immediate, unanticipated outcome of the party fusion was that, whereasthe mergers seriously damaged PDI, between 1973 and 1978 PPP’s Islamicidentity provided the party with a degree of cohesion. 20 The 1977 generalelection brought PPP and the government’s machine Golkar into direct conflictas they aggressively competed for the hearts and minds of Indonesians, with eachparty rallying support based on the two opposing claims of ‘Islam’ and‘development’. For instance, the Rais Aam of NU’s Religious Council andChairman of PPP’s Religious Council, Bisri Sjansuri, declared that ‘in order touphold the religion and law of Allah, every Muslim who takes part in the 1977general election, but especially a member of PPP, is legally obliged to vote PPPwhen the time comes’. 21 Sjansuri’s religious opinions seemed to carry someinfluence within the party and Golkar failed to make a dent in traditionalstrongholds of the Islamic parties, such as Aceh, South Sumatra, SouthKalimantan and East Java. 22In an effort to neutralise the Islamic appeal of PPP, the Minister of InternalAffairs, Amir Machmud, and the Commander of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo,led a campaign alleging the existence of an anti-government conspiracy in theform of a Komando Jihad (Islamic Holy War Command). Party leadersinterpreted statements made by Sudomo as offering a pretext for security forcesto arrest Muslim party politicians at whim, as well as seeing in it an impliedconnection between PPP, although publicly denied by Sudomo at the time, andMuslim ‘extremists’ who seek to establish an Islamic state. According to Liddle,the 1977 elections were conducted along the lines of the 1971 elections insofaras the government continued to make use of intimidation, coercion, propagandadirected against the parties, security screening of candidates, arrests,manipulation of party organisations, election regulations, party laws andcampaign restrictions. 23 In particular, screening of candidates by the stateintelligence co-ordinating organisation, Bakin, was meant to ensure that theMPR/DPR would be stacked with loyalists, which would facilitate executivecontrol over the passing of legislation. In short, government coercion, whichaimed to cow and drive into retreat the opposition, was part of its policy of
44 STATE MANAGEMENT OF MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONAL LIFEexclusion to ensure that it maintained preponderant control of the MPR and DPRthrough an overwhelming Golkar victory. By contrast, the increasinglycorporatised parties were locked into a system that, through engineeredelections, greatly restricted their access to legislatures and government office.The mix of state strategies, including corporatism, to control the parties andelections represented an ongoing process that sought to ensure the two-waypolitical exclusion of PPP from society and the state.The government was concerned by PPP’s increased vote, as Golkar’s share ofthe vote dropped marginally to 62.1 per cent (down 0.7 per cent), while PPPgained 29 per cent (up 2.18 per cent) of the final vote. 24 Suharto was not willingto have a ‘loyal opposition’ party in parliament that could disrupt enactment ofgovernment legislation. Vindication of the government’s concerns came in 1978,when the dominant faction of PPP, NU, led a walkout from the MPR generalsession in protest over two decrees. One decree gave religious status to mysticalbelief systems (aliran kepercayaan), equal to that of the official religions, andincorporated them into the broad outlines of state policy (GBHN). This decreewas aimed at reducing the strength of Islam by offering an officially approved,alternative form of organisational representation to non-practising Muslims, whomight otherwise have felt obliged to register under the religion of Islam. Theother decree introduced Pancasila moral instructions called P4 (Guidelines forthe Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila). Muslims perceived theP4 courses as being an attempt to turn Pancasila into a religion, particularly as itcould displace religious lessons in schools. NU staged a second walkout in 1980,as it refused to participate in the passing of new election laws in parliament,which NU leaders viewed as undemocratic. 25 At its national conference in 1981,NU unequivocally defied (the by now almost routine) national consensus bydeclining to endorse Suharto for a third presidential term, or to endorse his title of‘Father of Development’. 26The challenge posed by the NU faction of PPP convinced Suharto that moreinterventions were required to push NU further to the political margins. He beganby replacing Mintaredja with Jaelani Naro, who had instigated the earlier coup inParmusi, as chairman of PPP. Naro was imposed on PPP to discipline the partyand to neutralise the influence of NU within it. 27 Corporatist restructuring ofinterests allows the state to manoeuvre itself into a position of greater autonomyand prevent potential challenges to its power, by readjusting an ‘imbalance’ ofcontending group interests. Naro’s subsequent manipulations of PPP appeared toconform to this principle of reordering. Thus, Naro sought to resolve an ongoingdispute between the MI and NU elements over leadership of DPR commissions,by preparing a provisional candidate list for the 1982 general elections. Hedelivered the list on 27 October 1981 to the National Election Board, andunilaterally reallocated seats away from NU. NU lost seven of its seats to MI inthe list of candidates for the next DPR election, which eliminated itscommanding position of being able to over-rule the decisions of the otherconstituent members. These members now held a combined majority by one
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Managing Politics and Islam in Indo
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ContentsForeword viiPreface xAcknow
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viThe University Student Movement 1
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viiiWhile many authors have used a
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PrefaceThe book is the product of d
Page 13 and 14: Abbreviationsabangan Nominal Muslim
Page 15 and 16: xivFKLD Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Da
Page 17 and 18: xviKNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indo
Page 19 and 20: xviiiParmusi Partai Muslimin Indone
Page 21 and 22: xxWALUBIWMABYayasan AbdiBangsaYKPKY
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Page 31 and 32: 10 MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN I
Page 45 and 46: 24 STATE CORPORATISM AND INDONESIA
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MANAGING POLITICS AND ISLAM IN INDO
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Chapter 6Nahdlatul Ulama: Between I
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Tenggara. And later that month, he
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Chapter 7Intra-Elite RivalryIncorpo
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Chapter 8Mobilisations and Counter-
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MOBILISATIONS AND COUNTER-MOBILISAT
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Chapter 9The Unravelling of Suharto
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THE UNRAVELLING OF SUHARTO’S REGI
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ICMI and, once he was forced outsid
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Chapter 10Habibie and Party Plurali
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Chapter 11Conclusion: The Failure o
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF STATE CO
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ReferencesBOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, MONOG
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REFERENCES 243Dauvergne, Peter. ‘
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REFERENCES 245Honna, Jun. ‘The Mi
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REFERENCES 247—‘Why Do So Many
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REFERENCES 249—‘Islam and Polit
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REFERENCES 251National University,
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REFERENCES 253Nasional (Bagian II),
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IndexABRIGolkar, 24, 26, 30, 34, 14
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INDEX 257education, 36-39, 47-9, 50
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INDEX 259Tanjung, Feisal, 114-17, 1
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