Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

118 NAHDLATUL ULAMA: BETWEEN INCORPORATION AND INDEPENDENCESuharto had become aware that he risked alienating a major support base for hisown power. Suharto therefore made ‘a correction’ by recognising that ‘the NUcould also represent Islam’. 55 There was an element of truth to Abdurrahman’sstatement insofar as Suharto realised he needed NU’s support if he was toreceive unanimous endorsement at the MPR. The fact is that Abdurrahman hadalso identified the central role played by Suharto of alternately incorporating(ICMI) and excluding (mostly NU) Muslim interests.As was the case with the RMI held in Jakarta in 1994, Habibie and the ICMIintelligentsia saw the 1996 national meeting of pesantren at Probolinggo as achance to promote their own interests amidst speculation that Habibie was beinggroomed for the vice-presidency. Habibie introduced Adi Sasono, the ChiefEditor of the Republika, Parni Hadi, and Slamet Effendi Yusuf to a packedcrowd. He asked the kiai and ulama to open the door of pesantren ‘as wide aspossible for the ICMI so that it could help bring in appropriate technology toassist the surrounding community’. 56 Habibie donated 50 million rupiah to theRMI’s activities. The ICMI members from the NU, Salaluddin Wahid(Abdurrahman’s younger brother), Mohammad Thohir, and Slamet EffendiYusuf regarded the Probolinggo meeting as an opportunity to bring about areconciliation between Habibie and the NU chairman, and they formed a ‘smallteam’ to pursue their objective. 57Mohammad Tohir was behind an initiative to convene a meeting between theICMI chairman and the NU chairman. Abdurrahman replied to the initiative,suggesting that he had no objections to the idea, providing that Habibie promisedto announce at the meeting’s close that ICMI would ‘no longer dominatepolitical power’. Later that month, at ICMI’s national work meeting, Habibiereacted to Abdurrahman’s comments by declaring that he could see no reason tomeet with the NU chairman. 58It appeared, after all, that fences could not be mended between ICMI andAbdurrahman. His bad relations with Habibie, however, did not prevent him fromtrying to win Suharto’s approval. The NU chairman escorted Suharto’s daughter,Siti Rukmana (the leader of Golkar’s campaign in East and Central Java), on atour of pesantren and made public statements endorsing her credentials as anational leader. On 20 January 1997, he declared that it was all right if SitiRukmana won NU over to Golkar. 59 It appears that Suharto had tried to establishhis daughter’s strong presence in the PDI and NU/PPP strongholds. The Suhartogovernment, keen to gain substantial rural votes for its Golkar campaign,promised to funnel large funds into the NU’s traditional support base—thepesantren. In this context, the Minister of Religion arranged a meeting betweenAbdurrahman’s sister, the Chairperson of NU-Muslimat and Golkar member,Aisyah Baidlowi, and Siti Rukmana at which Suharto’s daughter contributedfunds for the construction of the Muslimat’s new headquarters. 60In other signs of rapprochement, in mid-February it was reported thatAbdurrahman would escort the Minister of Transmigration and Golkarcampaigner, Siswono Yudohusodo, on a tour of pesantren in West Nusa