Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia

134 INTRA-ELITE RIVALRYfrom ICMI—tried to bring the succession issue into ICMI’s discourse and intonational discourse. Both figures anticipated that Suharto would be out of office in1998. 8 However, in line with the regime’s stance that ICMI should not makepolitical statements of any kind, Habibie ensured that the succession issueremained outside of ICMI’s formal pronouncements. 9 Despite such caution, ICMImembers were concerned to gain influence over the terms of future succession,as political competition between elite groups was much more in the open thanhad hitherto been the case. Consequently, Adi Sasono, Amien Rais, and DawamRahardjo were among the ICMI interests backing Habibie in opposition to themilitary’s choice of Try Sutrisno for the vice-presidency in anticipation of afuture presidential race. Support for Habibie’s vice-presidential ambitions at atime of intensifying intra-elite competition provided an inevitable point ofconflict between ABRI leaders and ICMI. However, ICMI did not have anypublic political platform that reflected the aspirations of the intelligentsia, andtheir informal goals consequently lacked clear articulation or action programs.The following analysis first considers ICMI’s ‘unofficial’ agendas and thenlooks at points of ABRI-ICMI tension, including ABRI’s objections to theagendas.DemilitarisationSuharto’s retaliation against Gen. Benny Murdani’s network corresponded withan anti-Benny predisposition among ICMI’s intelligentsia and their desire fordemilitarisation of society. As defenders of the interests of a rising, educatedmiddle class, the ICMI intelligentsia were committed to the removal of militaryinfluence in the country’s political institutions. Members of this group alsoexpressed their discomfort with the kinds of security-intelligence rationales usedby ABRI in its suppression of dissent. In particular, they regarded the Catholicgeneral as being responsible for much of the New Order state’s anti-Islamicpolitical and military repression, and they blamed him for ordering the killing ofhundreds of Muslim demonstrators at Tanjung Priok in 1984. Since 1974, Bennyhad maintained close contact with the Centre for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS), a largely Chinese-Catholic run think-tank long associated withanti-Islamic measures when the Centre was part of Ali Murtopo’s empire. Theirattacks against Benny Murdani for what they regarded was his anti-Islamicsecurity measures, in particular, suited Suharto’s need to purge the armed forcesof Benny’s security network and loyalists. 10This congruence of interests, perhaps, was demonstrated by the appointment,in 1993, of the former Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the Army, SayidimanSuryohadiprojo, as senior ICMI adviser to Habibie on the military defenceindustry. In an interview with the national magazine, Editor, in his capacity asHabibie’s advisor, Sayidiman insisted that the intelligence role of the armedforces must be curtailed. Sayidiman mentioned the oversized role of intelligence,